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< Back to current issue of Immigration Daily < Back to current issue of Immigrant's Weekly

[Congressional Record: November 12, 2002 (House)]
[Page H8067-H8079]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr12no02-63]                         



 
              CYBER SECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACT

  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and concur in 
the Senate amendment to the bill (H.R. 3394) an Act to authorize 
funding for computer and network security research and development and 
research fellowship programs, and for other purposes.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Senate amendment:
       Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Cyber Security Research and 
     Development Act''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress finds the following:
       (1) Revolutionary advancements in computing and 
     communications technology have interconnected government, 
     commercial, scientific, and educational infrastructures--
     including critical infrastructures for electric power, 
     natural gas and petroleum production and distribution, 
     telecommunications, transportation, water supply, banking and 
     finance, and emergency and government services--in a vast, 
     interdependent physical and electronic network.
       (2) Exponential increases in interconnectivity have 
     facilitated enhanced communications, economic growth, and the 
     delivery of services critical to the public welfare, but have 
     also increased the consequences of temporary or prolonged 
     failure.
       (3) A Department of Defense Joint Task Force concluded 
     after a 1997 United States information warfare exercise that 
     the results ``clearly demonstrated our lack of preparation 
     for a coordinated cyber and physical attack on our critical 
     military and civilian infrastructure''.
       (4) Computer security technology and systems implementation 
     lack--
       (A) sufficient long term research funding;
       (B) adequate coordination across Federal and State 
     government agencies and among government, academia, and 
     industry; and
       (C) sufficient numbers of outstanding researchers in the 
     field.
       (5) Accordingly, Federal investment in computer and network 
     security research and development must be significantly 
     increased to--
       (A) improve vulnerability assessment and technological and 
     systems solutions;
       (B) expand and improve the pool of information security 
     professionals, including researchers, in the United States 
     workforce; and
       (C) better coordinate information sharing and collaboration 
     among industry, government, and academic research projects.
       (6) While African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native 
     Americans constitute 25 percent of the total United States 
     workforce and 30 percent of the college-age population, 
     members of these minorities comprise less than 7 percent of 
     the United States computer and information science workforce.

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of 
     the National Science Foundation.
       (2) Institution of higher education.--The term 
     ``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given 
     that term in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 
     1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)).

     SEC. 4. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION RESEARCH.

       (a) Computer and Network Security Research Grants.--
       (1) In general.--The Director shall award grants for basic 
     research on innovative approaches to the structure of 
     computer and network hardware and software that are aimed at 
     enhancing computer security. Research areas may include--
       (A) authentication, cryptography, and other secure data 
     communications technology;
       (B) computer forensics and intrusion detection;
       (C) reliability of computer and network applications, 
     middleware, operating systems, control systems, and 
     communications infrastructure;
       (D) privacy and confidentiality;
       (E) network security architecture, including tools for 
     security administration and analysis;
       (F) emerging threats;
       (G) vulnerability assessments and techniques for 
     quantifying risk;
       (H) remote access and wireless security; and
       (I) enhancement of law enforcement ability to detect, 
     investigate, and prosecute cyber-crimes, including those that 
     involve piracy of intellectual property.
       (2) Merit review; competition.--Grants shall be awarded 
     under this section on a merit-reviewed competitive basis.
       (3) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the National Science Foundation to 
     carry out this subsection--
       (A) $35,000,000 for fiscal year 2003;
       (B) $40,000,000 for fiscal year 2004;
       (C) $46,000,000 for fiscal year 2005;
       (D) $52,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; and
       (E) $60,000,000 for fiscal year 2007.
       (b) Computer and Network Security Research Centers.--
       (1) In general.--The Director shall award multiyear grants, 
     subject to the availability of appropriations, to 
     institutions of higher education, nonprofit research 
     institutions, or consortia thereof to establish 
     multidisciplinary Centers for Computer and Network Security 
     Research. Institutions of higher education, nonprofit 
     research institutions, or consortia thereof receiving such 
     grants may partner with 1 or more government laboratories or 
     for-profit institutions, or other institutions of higher 
     education or nonprofit research institutions.
       (2) Merit review; competition.--Grants shall be awarded 
     under this subsection on a merit-reviewed competitive basis.
       (3) Purpose.--The purpose of the Centers shall be to 
     generate innovative approaches to computer and network 
     security by conducting cutting-edge, multidisciplinary 
     research in computer and network security, including the 
     research areas described in subsection (a)(1).
       (4) Applications.--An institution of higher education, 
     nonprofit research institution, or consortia thereof seeking 
     funding under this subsection shall submit an application to 
     the Director at such time, in such manner, and containing 
     such information as the Director may require. The application 
     shall include, at a minimum, a description of--
       (A) the research projects that will be undertaken by the 
     Center and the contributions of each of the participating 
     entities;
       (B) how the Center will promote active collaboration among 
     scientists and engineers from different disciplines, such as 
     computer scientists, engineers, mathematicians, and social 
     science researchers;
       (C) how the Center will contribute to increasing the number 
     and quality of computer and network security researchers and 
     other professionals, including individuals from groups 
     historically underrepresented in these fields; and
       (D) how the center will disseminate research results 
     quickly and widely to improve cyber security in information 
     technology networks, products, and services.
       (5) Criteria.--In evaluating the applications submitted 
     under paragraph (4), the Director shall consider, at a 
     minimum--
       (A) the ability of the applicant to generate innovative 
     approaches to computer and network security and effectively 
     carry out the research program;
       (B) the experience of the applicant in conducting research 
     on computer and network security and the capacity of the 
     applicant to foster new multidisciplinary collaborations;
       (C) the capacity of the applicant to attract and provide 
     adequate support for a diverse group of undergraduate and 
     graduate students and postdoctoral fellows to pursue computer 
     and network security research; and
       (D) the extent to which the applicant will partner with 
     government laboratories, for-profit entities, other 
     institutions of higher education, or nonprofit research 
     institutions, and the role the partners will play in the 
     research undertaken by the Center.
       (6) Annual meeting.--The Director shall convene an annual 
     meeting of the Centers in order to foster collaboration and 
     communication between Center participants.
       (7) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated for the National Science Foundation to 
     carry out this subsection--
       (A) $12,000,000 for fiscal year 2003;
       (B) $24,000,000 for fiscal year 2004;
       (C) $36,000,000 for fiscal year 2005;
       (D) $36,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; and
       (E) $36,000,000 for fiscal year 2007.

     SEC. 5. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION COMPUTER AND NETWORK 
                   SECURITY PROGRAMS.

       (a) Computer and Network Security Capacity Building 
     Grants.--
       (1) In general.--The Director shall establish a program to 
     award grants to institutions of higher education (or 
     consortia thereof) to establish or improve undergraduate and 
     master's degree programs in computer and network security, to 
     increase the number of students, including the number of 
     students from groups historically underrepresented in these 
     fields, who pursue undergraduate or master's degrees in 
     fields

[[Page H8068]]

     related to computer and network security, and to provide 
     students with experience in government or industry related to 
     their computer and network security studies.
       (2) Merit review.--Grants shall be awarded under this 
     subsection on a merit-reviewed competitive basis.
       (3) Use of funds.--Grants awarded under this subsection 
     shall be used for activities that enhance the ability of an 
     institution of higher education (or consortium thereof) to 
     provide high-quality undergraduate and master's degree 
     programs in computer and network security and to recruit and 
     retain increased numbers of students to such programs. 
     Activities may include--
       (A) revising curriculum to better prepare undergraduate and 
     master's degree students for careers in computer and network 
     security;
       (B) establishing degree and certificate programs in 
     computer and network security;
       (C) creating opportunities for undergraduate students to 
     participate in computer and network security research 
     projects;
       (D) acquiring equipment necessary for student instruction 
     in computer and network security, including the installation 
     of testbed networks for student use;
       (E) providing opportunities for faculty to work with local 
     or Federal Government agencies, private industry, nonprofit 
     research institutions, or other academic institutions to 
     develop new expertise or to formulate new research directions 
     in computer and network security;
       (F) establishing collaborations with other academic 
     institutions or academic departments that seek to establish, 
     expand, or enhance programs in computer and network security;
       (G) establishing student internships in computer and 
     network security at government agencies or in private 
     industry;
       (H) establishing collaborations with other academic 
     institutions to establish or enhance a web-based collection 
     of computer and network security courseware and laboratory 
     exercises for sharing with other institutions of higher 
     education, including community colleges;
       (I) establishing or enhancing bridge programs in computer 
     and network security between community colleges and 
     universities; and
       (J) any other activities the Director determines will 
     accomplish the goals of this subsection.
       (4) Selection process.--
       (A) Application.--An institution of higher education (or a 
     consortium thereof) seeking funding under this subsection 
     shall submit an application to the Director at such time, in 
     such manner, and containing such information as the Director 
     may require. The application shall include, at a minimum--
       (i) a description of the applicant's computer and network 
     security research and instructional capacity, and in the case 
     of an application from a consortium of institutions of higher 
     education, a description of the role that each member will 
     play in implementing the proposal;
       (ii) a comprehensive plan by which the institution or 
     consortium will build instructional capacity in computer and 
     information security;
       (iii) a description of relevant collaborations with 
     government agencies or private industry that inform the 
     instructional program in computer and network security;
       (iv) a survey of the applicant's historic student 
     enrollment and placement data in fields related to computer 
     and network security and a study of potential enrollment and 
     placement for students enrolled in the proposed computer and 
     network security program; and
       (v) a plan to evaluate the success of the proposed computer 
     and network security program, including post-graduation 
     assessment of graduate school and job placement and retention 
     rates as well as the relevance of the instructional program 
     to graduate study and to the workplace.
       (B) Awards.--(i) The Director shall ensure, to the extent 
     practicable, that grants are awarded under this subsection in 
     a wide range of geographic areas and categories of 
     institutions of higher education, including minority serving 
     institutions.
       (ii) The Director shall award grants under this subsection 
     for a period not to exceed 5 years.
       (5) Assessment required.--The Director shall evaluate the 
     program established under this subsection no later than 6 
     years after the establishment of the program. At a minimum, 
     the Director shall evaluate the extent to which the program 
     achieved its objectives of increasing the quality and 
     quantity of students, including students from groups 
     historically underrepresented in computer and network 
     security related disciplines, pursuing undergraduate or 
     master's degrees in computer and network security.
       (6) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the National Science Foundation to 
     carry out this subsection--
       (A) $15,000,000 for fiscal year 2003;
       (B) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2004;
       (C) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2005;
       (D) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; and
       (E) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2007.
       (b) Scientific and Advanced Technology Act of 1992.--
       (1) Grants.--The Director shall provide grants under the 
     Scientific and Advanced Technology Act of 1992 (42 U.S.C. 
     1862i) for the purposes of section 3(a) and (b) of that Act, 
     except that the activities supported pursuant to this 
     subsection shall be limited to improving education in fields 
     related to computer and network security.
       (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the National Science Foundation to 
     carry out this subsection--
       (A) $1,000,000 for fiscal year 2003;
       (B) $1,250,000 for fiscal year 2004;
       (C) $1,250,000 for fiscal year 2005;
       (D) $1,250,000 for fiscal year 2006; and
       (E) $1,250,000 for fiscal year 2007.
       (c) Graduate Traineeships in Computer and Network Security 
     Research.--
       (1) In general.--The Director shall establish a program to 
     award grants to institutions of higher education to establish 
     traineeship programs for graduate students who pursue 
     computer and network security research leading to a doctorate 
     degree by providing funding and other assistance, and by 
     providing graduate students with research experience in 
     government or industry related to the students' computer and 
     network security studies.
       (2) Merit review.--Grants shall be provided under this 
     subsection on a merit-reviewed competitive basis.
       (3) Use of funds.--An institution of higher education shall 
     use grant funds for the purposes of--
       (A) providing traineeships to students who are citizens, 
     nationals, or lawfully admitted permanent resident aliens of 
     the United States and are pursuing research in computer or 
     network security leading to a doctorate degree;
       (B) paying tuition and fees for students receiving 
     traineeships under subparagraph (A);
       (C) establishing scientific internship programs for 
     students receiving traineeships under subparagraph (A) in 
     computer and network security at for-profit institutions, 
     nonprofit research institutions, or government laboratories; 
     and
       (D) other costs associated with the administration of the 
     program.
       (4) Traineeship amount.--Traineeships provided under 
     paragraph (3)(A) shall be in the amount of $25,000 per year, 
     or the level of the National Science Foundation Graduate 
     Research Fellowships, whichever is greater, for up to 3 
     years.
       (5) Selection process.--An institution of higher education 
     seeking funding under this subsection shall submit an 
     application to the Director at such time, in such manner, and 
     containing such information as the Director may require. The 
     application shall include, at a minimum, a description of--
       (A) the instructional program and research opportunities in 
     computer and network security available to graduate students 
     at the applicant's institution; and
       (B) the internship program to be established, including the 
     opportunities that will be made available to students for 
     internships at for-profit institutions, nonprofit research 
     institutions, and government laboratories.
       (6) Review of applications.--In evaluating the applications 
     submitted under paragraph (5), the Director shall consider--
       (A) the ability of the applicant to effectively carry out 
     the proposed program;
       (B) the quality of the applicant's existing research and 
     education programs;
       (C) the likelihood that the program will recruit increased 
     numbers of students, including students from groups 
     historically underrepresented in computer and network 
     security related disciplines, to pursue and earn doctorate 
     degrees in computer and network security;
       (D) the nature and quality of the internship program 
     established through collaborations with government 
     laboratories, nonprofit research institutions, and for-profit 
     institutions;
       (E) the integration of internship opportunities into 
     graduate students' research; and
       (F) the relevance of the proposed program to current and 
     future computer and network security needs.
       (7) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the National Science Foundation to 
     carry out this subsection--
       (A) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2003;
       (B) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2004;
       (C) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2005;
       (D) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; and
       (E) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2007.
       (d) Graduate Research Fellowships Program Support.--
     Computer and network security shall be included among the 
     fields of specialization supported by the National Science 
     Foundation's Graduate Research Fellowships program under 
     section 10 of the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 (42 
     U.S.C. 1869).
       (e) Cyber Security Faculty Development Traineeship 
     Program.--
       (1) In general.--The Director shall establish a program to 
     award grants to institutions of higher education to establish 
     traineeship programs to enable graduate students to pursue 
     academic careers in cyber security upon completion of 
     doctoral degrees.
       (2) Merit review; competition.--Grants shall be awarded 
     under this section on a merit-reviewed competitive basis.
       (3) Application.--Each institution of higher education 
     desiring to receive a grant under this subsection shall 
     submit an application to the Director at such time, in such 
     manner, and containing such information as the Director shall 
     require.
       (4) Use of funds.--Funds received by an institution of 
     higher education under this paragraph shall--
       (A) be made available to individuals on a merit-reviewed 
     competitive basis and in accordance with the requirements 
     established in paragraph (7);
       (B) be in an amount that is sufficient to cover annual 
     tuition and fees for doctoral study at an institution of 
     higher education for the duration of the graduate 
     traineeship, and shall include, in addition, an annual living 
     stipend of $25,000; and
       (C) be provided to individuals for a duration of no more 
     than 5 years, the specific duration of each graduate 
     traineeship to be determined by the institution of higher 
     education, on a case-by-case basis.
       (5) Repayment.--Each graduate traineeship shall--
       (A) subject to paragraph (5)(B), be subject to full 
     repayment upon completion of the doctoral

[[Page H8069]]

     degree according to a repayment schedule established and 
     administered by the institution of higher education;
       (B) be forgiven at the rate of 20 percent of the total 
     amount of the graduate traineeship assistance received under 
     this section for each academic year that a recipient is 
     employed as a full-time faculty member at an institution of 
     higher education for a period not to exceed 5 years; and
       (C) be monitored by the institution of higher education 
     receiving a grant under this subsection to ensure compliance 
     with this subsection.
       (6) Exceptions.--The Director may provide for the partial 
     or total waiver or suspension of any service obligation or 
     payment by an individual under this section whenever 
     compliance by the individual is impossible or would involve 
     extreme hardship to the individual, or if enforcement of such 
     obligation with respect to the individual would be 
     unconscionable.
       (7) Eligibility.--To be eligible to receive a graduate 
     traineeship under this section, an individual shall--
       (A) be a citizen, national, or lawfully admitted permanent 
     resident alien of the United States;
       (B) demonstrate a commitment to a career in higher 
     education.
       (8) Consideration.--In making selections for graduate 
     traineeships under this paragraph, an institution receiving a 
     grant under this subsection shall consider, to the extent 
     possible, a diverse pool of applicants whose interests are of 
     an interdisciplinary nature, encompassing the social 
     scientific as well as the technical dimensions of cyber 
     security.
       (9) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the National Science Foundation to 
     carry out this paragraph $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 
     2003 through 2007.

     SEC. 6. CONSULTATION.

       In carrying out sections 4 and 5, the Director shall 
     consult with other Federal agencies.

     SEC. 7. FOSTERING RESEARCH AND EDUCATION IN COMPUTER AND 
                   NETWORK SECURITY.

       Section 3(a) of the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 
     (42 U.S.C. 1862(a)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (6);
       (2) by striking ``Congress.'' in paragraph (7) and 
     inserting ``Congress ; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(8) to take a leading role in fostering and supporting 
     research and education activities to improve the security of 
     networked information systems.''.

     SEC. 8. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 
                   PROGRAMS.

       (a) Research Program.--The National Institute of Standards 
     and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 271 et seq.) is amended--
       (1) by moving section 22 to the end of the Act and 
     redesignating it as section 32;
       (2) by inserting after section 21 the following new 
     section:


      ``Sec. 22. research program on security of computer systems

       ``(a) Establishment.--The Director shall establish a 
     program of assistance to institutions of higher education 
     that enter into partnerships with for-profit entities to 
     support research to improve the security of computer systems. 
     The partnerships may also include government laboratories and 
     nonprofit research institutions. The program shall--
       ``(1) include multidisciplinary, long-term research;
       ``(2) include research directed toward addressing needs 
     identified through the activities of the Computer System 
     Security and Privacy Advisory Board under section 20(f); and
       ``(3) promote the development of a robust research 
     community working at the leading edge of knowledge in subject 
     areas relevant to the security of computer systems by 
     providing support for graduate students, post-doctoral 
     researchers, and senior researchers.
       ``(b) Fellowships.--
       ``(1) Post-doctoral research fellowships.--The Director is 
     authorized to establish a program to award post-doctoral 
     research fellowships to individuals who are citizens, 
     nationals, or lawfully admitted permanent resident aliens of 
     the United States and are seeking research positions at 
     institutions, including the Institute, engaged in research 
     activities related to the security of computer systems, 
     including the research areas described in section 4(a)(1) of 
     the Cyber Security Research and Development Act.
       ``(2) Senior research fellowships.--The Director is 
     authorized to establish a program to award senior research 
     fellowships to individuals seeking research positions at 
     institutions, including the Institute, engaged in research 
     activities related to the security of computer systems, 
     including the research areas described in section 4(a)(1) of 
     the Cyber Security Research and Development Act. Senior 
     research fellowships shall be made available for established 
     researchers at institutions of higher education who seek to 
     change research fields and pursue studies related to the 
     security of computer systems.
       ``(3) Eligibility.--
       ``(A) In general.--To be eligible for an award under this 
     subsection, an individual shall submit an application to the 
     Director at such time, in such manner, and containing such 
     information as the Director may require.
       ``(B) Stipends.--Under this subsection, the Director is 
     authorized to provide stipends for post-doctoral research 
     fellowships at the level of the Institute's Post Doctoral 
     Research Fellowship Program and senior research fellowships 
     at levels consistent with support for a faculty member in a 
     sabbatical position.
       ``(c) Awards; Applications.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Director is authorized to award 
     grants or cooperative agreements to institutions of higher 
     education to carry out the program established under 
     subsection (a). No funds made available under this section 
     shall be made available directly to any for-profit partners.
       ``(2) Eligibility.--To be eligible for an award under this 
     section, an institution of higher education shall submit an 
     application to the Director at such time, in such manner, and 
     containing such information as the Director may require. The 
     application shall include, at a minimum, a description of--
       ``(A) the number of graduate students anticipated to 
     participate in the research project and the level of support 
     to be provided to each;
       ``(B) the number of post-doctoral research positions 
     included under the research project and the level of support 
     to be provided to each;
       ``(C) the number of individuals, if any, intending to 
     change research fields and pursue studies related to the 
     security of computer systems to be included under the 
     research project and the level of support to be provided to 
     each; and
       ``(D) how the for-profit entities, nonprofit research 
     institutions, and any other partners will participate in 
     developing and carrying out the research and education agenda 
     of the partnership.
       ``(d) Program Operation.--
       ``(1) Management.--The program established under subsection 
     (a) shall be managed by individuals who shall have both 
     expertise in research related to the security of computer 
     systems and knowledge of the vulnerabilities of existing 
     computer systems. The Director shall designate such 
     individuals as program managers.
       ``(2) Managers may be employees.--Program managers 
     designated under paragraph (1) may be new or existing 
     employees of the Institute or individuals on assignment at 
     the Institute under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 
     1970, except that individuals on assignment at the Institute 
     under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970 shall not 
     directly manage such employees.
       ``(3) Manager responsibility.--Program managers designated 
     under paragraph (1) shall be responsible for--
       ``(A) establishing and publicizing the broad research goals 
     for the program;
       ``(B) soliciting applications for specific research 
     projects to address the goals developed under subparagraph 
     (A);
       ``(C) selecting research projects for support under the 
     program from among applications submitted to the Institute, 
     following consideration of--
       ``(i) the novelty and scientific and technical merit of the 
     proposed projects;
       ``(ii) the demonstrated capabilities of the individual or 
     individuals submitting the applications to successfully carry 
     out the proposed research;
       ``(iii) the impact the proposed projects will have on 
     increasing the number of computer security researchers;
       ``(iv) the nature of the participation by for-profit 
     entities and the extent to which the proposed projects 
     address the concerns of industry; and
       ``(v) other criteria determined by the Director, based on 
     information specified for inclusion in applications under 
     subsection (c); and
       ``(D) monitoring the progress of research projects 
     supported under the program.
       ``(4) Reports.--The Director shall report to the Senate 
     Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the 
     House of Representatives Committee on Science annually on the 
     use and responsibility of individuals on assignment at the 
     Institute under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970 
     who are performing duties under subsection (d).
       ``(e) Review of Program.--
       ``(1) Periodic review.--The Director shall periodically 
     review the portfolio of research awards monitored by each 
     program manager designated in accordance with subsection (d). 
     In conducting those reviews, the Director shall seek the 
     advice of the Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory 
     Board, established under section 21, on the appropriateness 
     of the research goals and on the quality and utility of 
     research projects managed by program managers in accordance 
     with subsection (d).
       ``(2) Comprehensive 5-year review.--The Director shall also 
     contract with the National Research Council for a 
     comprehensive review of the program established under 
     subsection (a) during the 5th year of the program. Such 
     review shall include an assessment of the scientific quality 
     of the research conducted, the relevance of the research 
     results obtained to the goals of the program established 
     under subsection (d)(3)(A), and the progress of the program 
     in promoting the development of a substantial academic 
     research community working at the leading edge of knowledge 
     in the field. The Director shall submit to Congress a report 
     on the results of the review under this paragraph no later 
     than 6 years after the initiation of the program.
       ``(f) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Computer system.--The term `computer system' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 20(d)(1).
       ``(2) Institution of higher education.--The term 
     `institution of higher education' has the meaning given that 
     term in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 
     (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)).''.
       (b) Amendment of Computer System Definition.--Section 
     20(d)(1)(B)(i) of National Institute of Standards and 
     Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3(d)(1)(B)(i)) is amended to 
     read as follows:
       ``(i) computers and computer networks;''.
       (c) Checklists for Government Systems.--
       (1) In general.--The Director of the National Institute of 
     Standards and Technology shall develop, and revise as 
     necessary, a checklist setting forth settings and option 
     selections that

[[Page H8070]]

     minimize the security risks associated with each computer 
     hardware or software system that is, or is likely to become, 
     widely used within the Federal government.
       (2) Priorities for development; excluded systems.--The 
     Director of the National Institute of Standards and 
     Technology may establish priorities for the development of 
     checklists under this paragraph on the basis of the security 
     risks associated with the use of the system, the number of 
     agencies that use a particular system, the usefulness of the 
     checklist to Federal agencies that are users or potential 
     users of the system, or such other factors as the Director 
     determines to be appropriate. The Director of the National 
     Institute of Standards and Technology may exclude from the 
     application of paragraph (1) any computer hardware or 
     software system for which the Director of the National 
     Institute of Standards and Technology determines that the 
     development of a checklist is inappropriate because of the 
     infrequency of use of the system, the obsolescence of the 
     system, or the inutility or impracticability of developing a 
     checklist for the system.
       (3) Dissemination of checklists.--The Director of the 
     National Institute of Standards and Technology shall make any 
     checklist developed under this paragraph for any computer 
     hardware or software system available to each Federal agency 
     that is a user or potential user of the system.
       (4) Agency use requirements.--The development of a 
     checklist under paragraph (1) for a computer hardware or 
     software system does not--
       (A) require any Federal agency to select the specific 
     settings or options recommended by the checklist for the 
     system;
       (B) establish conditions or prerequisites for Federal 
     agency procurement or deployment of any such system;
       (C) represent an endorsement of any such system by the 
     Director of the National Institute of Standards and 
     Technology; nor
       (D) preclude any Federal agency from procuring or deploying 
     other computer hardware or software systems for which no such 
     checklist has been developed.
       (d) Federal Agency Information Security Programs.--
       (1) In general.--In developing the agencywide information 
     security program required by section 3534(b) of title 44, 
     United States Code, an agency that deploys a computer 
     hardware or software system for which the Director of the 
     National Institute of Standards and Technology has developed 
     a checklist under subsection (c) of this section--
       (A) shall include in that program an explanation of how the 
     agency has considered such checklist in deploying that 
     system; and
       (B) may treat the explanation as if it were a portion of 
     the agency's annual performance plan properly classified 
     under criteria established by an Executive Order (within the 
     meaning of section 1115(d) of title 31, United States Code).
       (2) Limitation.--Paragraph (1) does not apply to any 
     computer hardware or software system for which the National 
     Institute of Standards and Technology does not have 
     responsibility under section 20(a)(3) of the National 
     Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C.278g-
     3(a)(3)).

     SEC. 9. COMPUTER SECURITY REVIEW, PUBLIC MEETINGS, AND 
                   INFORMATION.

       Section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and 
     Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new subsection:
       ``(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are 
     authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary $1,060,000 for 
     fiscal year 2003 and $1,090,000 for fiscal year 2004 to 
     enable the Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory 
     Board, established by section 21, to identify emerging 
     issues, including research needs, related to computer 
     security, privacy, and cryptography and, as appropriate, to 
     convene public meetings on those subjects, receive 
     presentations, and publish reports, digests, and summaries 
     for public distribution on those subjects.''.

     SEC. 10. INTRAMURAL SECURITY RESEARCH.

       Section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and 
     Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3), as amended by this Act, is 
     further amended by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection 
     (f), and by inserting after subsection (d) the following:
       ``(e) Intramural Security Research.--As part of the 
     research activities conducted in accordance with subsection 
     (b)(4), the Institute shall--
       ``(1) conduct a research program to address emerging 
     technologies associated with assembling a networked computer 
     system from components while ensuring it maintains desired 
     security properties;
       ``(2) carry out research associated with improving the 
     security of real-time computing and communications systems 
     for use in process control; and
       ``(3) carry out multidisciplinary, long-term, high-risk 
     research on ways to improve the security of computer 
     systems.''.

     SEC. 11. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of 
     Commerce for the National Institute of Standards and 
     Technology--
       (1) for activities under section 22 of the National 
     Institute of Standards and Technology Act, as added by 
     section 8 of this Act--
       (A) $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2003;
       (B) $40,000,000 for fiscal year 2004;
       (C) $55,000,000 for fiscal year 2005;
       (D) $70,000,000 for fiscal year 2006;
       (E) $85,000,000 for fiscal year 2007; and
       (2) for activities under section 20(f) of the National 
     Institute of Standards and Technology Act, as added by 
     section 10 of this Act--
       (A) $6,000,000 for fiscal year 2003;
       (B) $6,200,000 for fiscal year 2004;
       (C) $6,400,000 for fiscal year 2005;
       (D) $6,600,000 for fiscal year 2006; and
       (E) $6,800,000 for fiscal year 2007.

     SEC. 12. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES STUDY ON COMPUTER AND 
                   NETWORK SECURITY IN CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES.

       (a) Study.--Not later than 3 months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Institute 
     of Standards and Technology shall enter into an arrangement 
     with the National Research Council of the National Academy of 
     Sciences to conduct a study of the vulnerabilities of the 
     Nation's network infrastructure and make recommendations for 
     appropriate improvements. The National Research Council 
     shall--
       (1) review existing studies and associated data on the 
     architectural, hardware, and software vulnerabilities and 
     interdependencies in United States critical infrastructure 
     networks;
       (2) identify and assess gaps in technical capability for 
     robust critical infrastructure network security and make 
     recommendations for research priorities and resource 
     requirements; and
       (3) review any and all other essential elements of computer 
     and network security, including security of industrial 
     process controls, to be determined in the conduct of the 
     study.
       (b) Report.--The Director of the National Institute of 
     Standards and Technology shall transmit a report containing 
     the results of the study and recommendations required by 
     subsection (a) to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, 
     and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee 
     on Science not later than 21 months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act.
       (c) Security.--The Director of the National Institute of 
     Standards and Technology shall ensure that no information 
     that is classified is included in any publicly released 
     version of the report required by this section.
       (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Secretary of Commerce for the 
     National Institute of Standards and Technology for the 
     purposes of carrying out this section, $700,000.

     SEC. 13. COORDINATION OF FEDERAL CYBER SECURITY RESEARCH AND 
                   DEVELOPMENT

       The Director of the National Science Foundation and the 
     Director of the National Institute of Standards and 
     Technology shall coordinate the research programs authorized 
     by this Act or pursuant to amendments made by this Act. The 
     Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall 
     work with the Director of the National Science Foundation and 
     the Director of the National Institute of Standards and 
     Technology to ensure that programs authorized by this Act or 
     pursuant to amendments made by this Act are taken into 
     account in any government-wide cyber security research 
     effort.

     SEC. 14. OFFICE OF SPACE COMMERCIALIZATION.

       Section 8(a) of the Technology Administration Act of 1998 
     (15 U.S.C. 1511e(a)) is amended by inserting ``the Technology 
     Administration of'' after ``within''.

     SEC. 15. TECHNICAL CORRECTION OF NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION SAFETY 
                   TEAM ACT.

       Section 2(c)(1)(d) of the National Construction Safety Team 
     Act is amended by striking ``section 8;'' and inserting 
     ``section 7;''.

     SEC. 16. GRANT ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS AND COMPLIANCE WITH 
                   IMMIGRATION LAWS.

       (a) Immigration Status.--No grant or fellowship may be 
     awarded under this Act, directly or indirectly, to any 
     individual who is in violation of the terms of his or her 
     status as a nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15)(F), (M), or 
     (J) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
     1101(a)(15)(F), (M), or (J)).
       (b) Aliens from Certain Countries.--No grant or fellowship 
     may be awarded under this Act, directly or indirectly, to any 
     alien from a country that is a state sponsor of international 
     terrorism, as defined under section 306(b) of the Enhanced 
     Border Security and VISA Entry Reform Act (8 U.S.C. 1735(b)), 
     unless the Secretary of State determines, in consultation 
     with the Attorney General and the heads of other appropriate 
     agencies, that such alien does not pose a threat to the 
     safety or national security of the United States.
       (c) Non-complying Institutions.--No grant or fellowship may 
     be awarded under this Act, directly or indirectly, to any 
     institution of higher education or non-profit institution (or 
     consortia thereof) that has--
       (1) materially failed to comply with the recordkeeping and 
     reporting requirements to receive nonimmigrant students or 
     exchange visitor program participants under section 
     101(a)(15)(F), (M), or (J) of the Immigration and Nationality 
     Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(F), (M), or (J)), or section 641 of 
     the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996 
     (8 U.S.C. 1372), as required by section 502 of the Enhanced 
     Border Security and VISA Entry Reform Act (8 U.S.C. 1762); or
       (2) been suspended or terminated pursuant to section 502(c) 
     of the Enhanced Border Security and VISA Entry Reform Act (8 
     U.S.C 1762(c)).

     SEC. 17. REPORT ON GRANT AND FELLOWSHIP PROGRAMS.

       Within 24 months after the date of enactment of this Act, 
     the Director, in consultation with the Assistant to the 
     President for National Security Affairs, shall submit to 
     Congress a report reviewing this Act to ensure that the 
     programs and fellowships are being awarded under this Act to 
     individuals and institutions of higher education who are in 
     compliance with the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
     1101 et seq.) in order to protect our national security.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from

[[Page H8071]]

New York (Mr. Boehlert) and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Baird) 
each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert).


                             General Leave

  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their 
remarks and to include extraneous material on H.R. 3394.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to bring H.R. 3394, the Cyber Security 
Research and Development Act, before the House again, this time for 
final passage.
  Back in February, the House passed the bill 400 to 12, a sign of the 
widely recognized need for this legislation. The Senate, by unanimous 
consent, has now returned the bill to us entirely intact, with a few 
negotiated noncontroversial additions. These additions include an 
additional fellowship program, greater efforts to approve the security 
of Federal computers, language to ensure that existing rules concerning 
foreign students are being enforced, and a technical correction to the 
bill we passed in response to the collapse of the World Trade Center.
  With this background, no one should be surprised that I expect this 
bill to be signed shortly by the President. That is as it should be. 
H.R. 3394 will provide a targeted solution to a serious but largely 
overlooked problem: cyber security.
  Cyber security is a problem that is even worse than it first appears. 
That is because not only are our Nation's computers and networks 
vulnerable to attack, and not only could a cyber attack disrupt our 
economy and threaten public health and safety, but we simply do not 
know enough about how to design computers and networks to make them 
less vulnerable.
  For too long, cyber security has just not been a research priority. 
The private sector was much more focused on making computers cheaper, 
faster, and easier to use. The market did not put a premium on 
security. Government similarly turned its attention elsewhere.
  As a result, computers have become omnipresent. We are more and more 
at their mercy, without becoming any more secure. In an age of 
terrorism, such willful ignorance about cyber security has got to come 
to an end.

                              {time}  1430

  We received yet another reminder of that monumental fact last month 
when the servers that run the Internet in the United States were 
subject to a concerted attack from overseas.
  H.R. 3394 is designed quite simply, to usher in a new era in cyber 
security research. Cyber security research will no longer be a 
backwater, but rather will become a priority at two of our premier 
research agencies, the National Science Foundation and the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, and through them, a priority in 
academia and industry.
  And the programs created by H.R. 3394 are designed not only to spur 
new thinking about how to safeguard computers and networks in both the 
short and long run, but to make sure that we have a cadre of experts 
who will devote their careers to improving cyber security. The bill 
includes incentives for researchers to turn their attention to cyber 
security, and incentives to attract students to the field at the 
undergraduate, graduate and post-doctoral levels.
  In short, this bill is a targeted but comprehensive attempt to ensure 
that the Nation's best minds are focused on improving cyber security. 
That is what it will take to stave off a cyber attack.
  I want to thank the many people inside and outside Congress who 
helped us bring this bill to fruition. Bill Wulf, the president of the 
National Academy of Engineering, is really the godfather of this bill, 
bringing the problem and potential solutions to our attention, and he 
has always been available to bounce ideas off of. Industry groups have 
been enormously helpful and supportive, including the Information 
Technology Association of America and the National Association of 
Manufacturers.
  This bill has been a bipartisan effort from its inception. I want to 
thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hall), the ranking member, and the 
other Members of the minority, including the gentleman from Washington 
(Mr. Baird), who have helped shape this bill. We have had similar 
partnership in the other body led by Senators Wyden and Allen.
  In short, H.R. 3394 is a bipartisan approach to a very real but very 
solvable problem. I urge its final passage, not just because it is 
needed, but because it will reflect the fine efforts of so many 
dedicated people on the staff of both the Republican and Democrat side. 
This bill has been bicameral, and has the private sector working in 
partnership with government. That is the way it should be. We are 
addressing a very serious problem, and trying to get ahold of it before 
it gets out of hand, and I am optimistic we are moving in the right 
direction.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge final passage of this bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 3394, the Cyber 
Security Research and Development Act. I thank the gentleman from New 
York (Chairman Boehlert) for his outstanding leadership on this bill, 
and commend the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hall) for his leadership as 
well.
  I am tremendously honored that H.R. 3316, a computer security bill 
that I authored along with the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert), 
are included in today's bill.
  Essentially, H.R. 3394 is the same as the version that was passed by 
the House back in February. This legislation will address the long-term 
needs to secure the Nation's information infrastructure, as well as 
strengthening the security of the nonclassified computer systems of our 
Federal agencies.
  Since September 11, attention has been focused in an unprecedented 
way on increasing our security against terrorism. Today, security has 
to mean more than locking doors and installing metal detectors. In 
addition to physical security, virtual information systems that are 
vital to our Nation's security and economy must be protected. 
Telecommunications and computer technologies are vulnerable to attack 
from far away by enemies who can remain anonymous, hidden in the vast 
maze of the Internet.
  Examples of systems that rely on computer networks include our 
electric power grid, rail networks and financial transaction networks. 
The gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert) and the gentlewoman from 
Maryland (Mrs. Morella), the former chairman of the subcommittee, have 
had the foresight to begin hearings on this matter, even well before 
September 11. It is that kind of forward thinking that we need to 
protect our Nation's security and to secure our information 
infrastructure from cyber attacks.
  Our vulnerability to Internet-based computer viruses, denial of 
service attacks, and defaced websites is well known to the general 
public. Such widely reported and indeed widely experienced events have 
increased in frequency over time. These attacks disrupt business and 
government activities, sometimes resulting in significant recovery 
costs.
  While we have yet to face a catastrophic cyber attack thus far, 
Richard Clarke, the chair of the President's Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Board, has said that the government must make cyber security 
a priority or we face the possibility of what he termed a digital Pearl 
Harbor.
  Potentially vulnerable computer systems are largely owned and 
operated by the private sector, but the government has an important 
role in supporting the research and development activities that provide 
the tools for protecting information systems. An essential component 
for ensuring improved information security is a vigorous and creative 
basic research effort focused on the security of networked information 
systems.
  Witnesses at our Committee on Science hearings last year noted the 
anemic level of funding for research on computer and network security. 
Such lack of funding has resulted in the lack of a critical mass of 
researchers in the field and has severely limited the focus

[[Page H8072]]

of research. The witnesses at the hearings advocated increased and 
sustained research funding from the Federal Government to support both 
expanded training and research on a long-term basis.
  H.R. 3394 meets those needs. It authorizes $903 million over 5 years 
to create new cyber security programs within the National Science 
Foundation and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. 
Under the bill, the NSF will create new cyber security research 
centers, undergraduate grants, community college grants, and 
fellowships.
  The legislation also includes language I authored pertaining to NIST. 
The bill requires NIST to create new program grants for partnerships 
between academia and industry, new post-doctoral students, and a new 
program to encourage senior researchers in other fields to work on 
computer security.
  I believe the legislation before us today will provide the resources 
necessary to ensure the security of business networks and the safety of 
America's computer infrastructure. I thank the staff of the Committee 
on Science for their tireless work on H.R. 3394, and I urge all members 
to support this important measure.
  Mr. Speaker, I invite the chairman of the Committee on Science to 
enter into a brief colloquy to ask for two brief points of 
clarification.
  Section 16(c) forbids the NSF from awarding grants or fellowships to 
institutions of higher education or nonprofit institutions that 
materially fail to comply with record-keeping requirements under 
certain sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act. This section does not have 
an effective date at present. Many of these record-keeping requirements 
have yet to be written or promulgated. Therefore, the effective date 
for this subsection cannot be the date of enactment. In bringing the 
bill forward for consideration by the House, what is the gentleman's 
intent concerning the effective date for this provision?
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BAIRD. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Washington makes a very 
important point. Neither the Immigration and Naturalization Service nor 
the Department of State have provided final guidance to enable 
universities to participate in the new Student Exchange Visitor 
Information System, which provides tracking, monitoring, and access to 
accurate and current information on nonimmigration students and 
exchange visas.
  It is not possible to be materially out of compliance with these 
requirements until the final guidance and an appropriate time for 
implementation have been provided to the university research community.
  Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Speaker, my second question deals with Section 17 that 
requires the Director, 24 months after the date of enactment of this 
act, to submit a report to Congress reviewing this act to ensure that 
awards under the act are made to individuals and institutions that are 
in compliance with the Immigration and Nationality Act. I assume this 
is a simple reporting requirement similar to other reports to Congress 
by the NSF and that it is not meant to require the Director to enforce 
our Nation's immigration laws?
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman would continue to yield, 
the gentleman is correct. Enforcement of the immigration laws is the 
responsibility of the INS and the State Department. Section 17 requires 
that NSF report to Congress on information it obtains from institutions 
of higher education, State and INS. This section does not require the 
NSF Director to commission a duplicative study to secure information 
that should be readily obtainable from the State Department and INS.
  Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for that clarification, 
and thank the gentleman for his leadership on this legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield the 
balance of my time to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Ehlers) for 
purposes of control.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Culberson). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Oregon (Mr. Wu).
  Mr. WU. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 3394, the Cyber 
Security Research and Development Act. We have become increasingly 
reliant on the Internet and computer technology. And unfortunately, 
with this reliance comes increased vulnerability to cyber attacks on 
our network systems and infrastructure. America's network 
infrastructure is increasingly exposed to both benign and destructive 
disruptions, including defacement of web sites, denial of service, 
virus infections throughout the computer networks, and unauthorized 
intrusions and sabotage of systems and networks.
  Past attacks show the types of danger and potential disruption cyber 
attacks can have on our Nation's infrastructure. The cyber threats to 
this country are significant and getting more sophisticated as time 
goes by.
  A recent survey found that 85 percent of respondents experienced 
computer intrusions. Moreover, Carnegie Mellon University's CERT 
Coordination Center, which serves as a reporting center for Internet 
security problems, received almost six times the number of 
vulnerability reports in 2001 as it did just 2 years earlier. 
Similarly, the number of specific incidents reported to CERT exploded 
from 9.589 in 1999 to 52,658 in 2001. Even more alarming is CERT's 
estimates that these statistics may only represent 20 percent of the 
incidents that actually occurred.
  The Cyber Security Research and Development Act will play a major 
role in fostering greater research in methods to prevent future cyber 
attacks and design more secure networks. This legislation will harness 
and link the intellectual power of the National Science Foundation, the 
National Institute of Science and Technology, universities, and private 
industry to develop new computer cryptography authentication, 
firewalls, forensics, intrusion detection, wireless security and 
systems management.
  In addition, this bill is designed to draw more college undergraduate 
and graduate students into the field of cyber security. It establishes 
programs to use internships, research opportunities and better 
equipment to engage students in this field.
  America is a leader in computer hardware and software development. In 
order to preserve America's technologic edge and our security, we must 
have a continuous pipeline of new students in computer science and 
research.
  I strongly support this legislation and I am proud to support this 
important bill as it moved through the Committee on Science and again 
as it passed the House earlier this February. I commend the leadership 
of the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Baird), Senator Wyden from 
Oregon, and the chairman of the Committee on Science, the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Boehlert), for their leadership in moving this bill. 
I am confident that the Federal investment for long-term projects 
outlined in this legislation will enhance the security of our cyber 
homeland.
  Mr. EHLERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Smith).
  Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I thank all Members who worked on 
this, but certainly commend the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hall), the 
ranking member, and the gentleman from New York (Chairman Boehlert) for 
having the foresight and commitment to initiate and advance this 
legislation that I would suggest is very important.
  As chairman of the Subcommittee on Research, I am proud to have 
worked on this bill and to be a prime sponsor. This act establishes 
programs at both the National Science Foundation and NIST, the National 
Institute for Standards and Technology, to advance research and, 
perhaps most importantly, develop a talented workforce of cyber 
security researchers and professionals.
  While the focus in information technology has largely been to build 
it faster, build it smaller, and build it less expensive, perhaps now 
more than ever we need to know how to build it safer and more secure.

[[Page H8073]]

  The programs authorized by this act provide much needed support for 
the research that will help us understand just how to do that. By 
supporting undergraduate and graduate post-doctoral students, as well 
as senior researchers who wish to focus some of their research efforts 
on cyber security, we will train the experts who make sure the 
appropriate safeguards are in place to protect us from malicious cyber 
attacks.

                              {time}  1445

  It is a huge challenge. It is not going to come cheaply and it is not 
going to come easily.
  There are some unique features of this bill that will make it 
particularly effective in fostering innovative research and education 
in cyber security. For example, this act will establish a program at 
the National Science Foundation to help institutions of higher 
education purchase the equipment that they need so that students can 
learn how to prevent cyber attacks without risking the integrity of the 
college's own computer network. Another program established by this act 
at the National Institute of Standards and Technology will support the 
kind of high-risk, high-payoff research that is necessary to make great 
advances in cyber security but that is unlikely to get funded under the 
traditional peer-review process that tends to favor more conservative 
approaches to research questions. In addition, in recognition of the 
fact that effective cyber security will rely largely on the expertise 
of computer technicians, this bill amends the Scientific and Advanced 
Technology Act of 1992 to provide the National Science Foundation 
funding to 2-year colleges to make sure that graduates of technical 
programs are properly trained in cyber security.
  Just a few weeks ago, an electronic attack crippled 13 computer 
servers that manage Internet traffic. While this hour-long attack went 
nearly unnoticed by routine computer users, a longer attack could 
cripple communication, infrastructure operations and even national 
security efforts. This country more than any other country in the world 
has come to depend on our software and our computer technology, from 
how we run our financial services to how we move our railroads to 
certainly our airlines and transportation down to how we transfer 
electrical power throughout the United States, not to mention our 
national security and our military efforts. We cannot allow these kinds 
of attacks to happen.
  In conclusion, as we move forward in our war against terrorism, it is 
going to be as important for us to secure cyber space as it will be for 
us to secure homeland security against malicious attack. I look forward 
to working with the National Science Foundation as they implement the 
programs authorized by this act.
  Mr. EHLERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Smith).
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. I thank the gentleman from Michigan for yielding 
me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I support the Senate amendment to H.R. 3394, the Cyber 
Security Research and Development Act. Earlier this year, a federally 
funded research center operated by Carnegie Mellon University reported 
that breaches in security of computer systems more than doubled from 
2000 to 2001. More than 52,000 incidents were reported in 2001, up from 
22,000 in 2000.
  Last spring the Committee on the Judiciary's Subcommittee on Crime, 
Terrorism and Homeland Security that I chair held a series of hearings 
on cyber crime. We heard testimony from local, State and Federal 
officials and also from the private sector. A common observation 
emerged: The demand for highly trained and skilled personnel to 
investigate computer crimes is tremendous. This problem is compounded 
by the rapid advances in technology which make continued training an 
absolute necessity. We must have training both for a new generation of 
cyber warriors whose most important weapon is not a gun but a laptop 
and for private sector companies that must protect their Internet 
presence.
  This bill seeks to expand what many States and cities are already 
doing, investing in cyber security training activities. In my hometown, 
the University of Texas at San Antonio has established the Center for 
Information Assurance and Security, known as CIAS. The CIAS will be the 
hub of a city initiative to research, develop and address computer 
protection mechanisms to prevent and detect intrusions on computer 
networks. With funding provided in this bill, UTSA and dozens of other 
universities will be able to train the next generation of cyber 
warriors, cyber defenders and ``white hat netizens.'' This legislation 
supports the work at UTSA and other universities for students who want 
to pursue computer security studies.
  While the benefits of the digital age are obvious, the Internet also 
has fostered an environment where hackers retrieve private data for 
amusement, individuals distribute software illegally, and viruses 
circulate with the sole purpose of debilitating computers. A well-
trained and highly skilled force of cyber protectors is urgently needed 
in America today.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
  Mr. EHLERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  It is my pleasure to see this bill reach the floor for final passage 
and on its way to the President. I certainly agree with all the 
comments that have been made and I will not repeat them, but I did want 
to point out that in passing this legislation, both the House and the 
Senate have recognized the important role that the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology plays in cyber security. This is very 
important to note, because in the original proposal for the homeland 
security bill that particular activity would have been transferred out 
of the National Institute of Standards and Technology and placed in the 
Department of Homeland Security. I think that would have been very 
disruptive to the activity, but the important thing to recognize is 
that this group at the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
is the leading group in doing the basic research necessary to solve our 
cyber security problems. Members of the House and of the Senate working 
on the homeland security legislation should embrace this role as well. 
While there have been proposals to transfer NIST's cyber security 
division into the new department, this legislation clearly identifies 
the role that NIST should play in cyber security. As such, the 
proposals to move this responsibility elsewhere do not meet the test. 
Any conference agreement should recognize this as well by keeping 
NIST's cyber security division within NIST.
  Let me also add that to most individuals in this land, cyber security 
means not having someone steal their credit card number. That is a very 
important function. But there is much more at stake here, as we have 
heard. That is the Nation's security. Two years ago, I wrote a report 
for the NATO parliamentary assembly, which is the legislative body 
relating to NATO, that discussed and studied information warfare. Much 
of what I said in that report is pertinent to this discussion today.
  Mr. Speaker, I include that report at this point in the proceedings.

             Information Warfare and International Security


                            I. INTRODUCTION

       1. The importance of Information Technology (IT) to the 
     functioning of our societies is evident in virtually every 
     human activity. Computers are involved in and often control 
     everything from government operations to transportation, from 
     energy to finance, from telecommunications to water 
     management. Every day an enormous amount of information is 
     exchanged or stored by electronic means and trillions of 
     dollars travel throughout the world electronically. 
     Information technology has become even more pervasive with 
     the widespread dispersion of personal computers. According to 
     projections of the US Computer Industry Almanac, by the year 
     2000 there will be more than 550 million PCs in the world, 
     230 million of which will be connected to the Internet (92 
     million in the United States alone).
       2. The pace of technological change and our increasing 
     reliance on technology are even more impressive. Five years 
     ago, a computer chip could carry the equivalent of 1.1 
     million transistors. Now the number has increased to 120 
     million and engineers believe they can reach 400 million and 
     even 1 billion. Capable of 256 billion multiplications per 
     second, the latest desktop computers have acquired the speed 
     of yesterday's supercomputers. This has accelerated the 
     dispersion and use of the Internet. To achieve mass-user 
     status, it took radio 35 years, television 13 years and the 
     Internet only 4 years. Microsoft experts assert that Internet 
     traffic doubles every 100 days and, according to other 
     estimates, one billion people (one-sixth of humanity) will be 
     on-line by 2005.

[[Page H8074]]

       3. The reliance of our societies on computers and the fact 
     that many critical infrastructures are electronically 
     interconnected poses evident security problems. Although 
     computer experts have been working on these problems for 
     years, only in the mid-1990s did Western defence analysts 
     begin to pay serious attention to them. In a variety of 
     studies and reports, a strategic catch phrase emerged to 
     define a new concept: Information Warfare. In a 1997 Report, 
     the NAA Science and Technology Committee provided a first 
     assessment of Information Warfare, analysing most of the 
     available sources on the subject. The threat of possible 
     attacks on information systems and the potential risks for 
     our military and civilian infrastructures were outlined in 
     that Report. (1)
       4. In the last two years technological advances as well as 
     governmental and international actions have changed the world 
     of information security. As a consequence, the subject of 
     information warfare has been extensively discussed and 
     analysed, both within and outside the information technology 
     and defence communities. This report analyses these new 
     developments, starting with some new definitions of 
     information warfare, assesses the effective strategic 
     threats, and reports about the US and other governments' 
     initiatives to counter them. It is also our intention to 
     consider the concerns expressed by the science and technology 
     community about the possible overstatement of such threats, 
     especially with reference to some cases of media hyperbole.


                    II. WHAT IS INFORMATION WARFARE?

                             A. Definitions

       5. The cited 1997 STC Report emphasised the distinction 
     between the use of information in warfare and the newer 
     concept of information warfare, the first being recognised 
     since ancient times and referring basically to tactical and 
     strategic deception, war propaganda, and destruction of 
     command and control systems. In the current 
     conceptualisation, information warfare ``extends far beyond 
     the traditional battlefield, and its possible perpetrators 
     and victims are by no means confined to the military''. A few 
     definitions were reported then, to which your Rapporteur 
     would like to add some new ones. The first is proposed by the 
     Institute for the Advanced Study of Information Warfare: 
     ``Information warfare is the offensive and defensive use of 
     information and information systems to exploit, corrupt, or 
     destroy an adversary's information and information systems, 
     while protecting one's own. Such actions are designed to 
     achieve advantages over military or business adversaries.'' 
     (2)
       6. The International Centre for Security Analysis of King's 
     College, London suggests that information warfare ``is about 
     struggles for control over information activities'' and 
     distinguishes three levels or categories: ideational struggle 
     for the mind of an opponent, struggle for information 
     dominance, and attacks on, and defence of, information flows 
     and activities. The first, highest level ``encompasses the 
     whole range of psychological, media, diplomatic and military 
     techniques for influencing the mind of an opponent, whether 
     that opponent is a military commander or a whole 
     population''. The second level could be assimilated with the 
     Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), whose theorists and 
     advocates see, as the future evolution of armed forces, the 
     goal of dominating the ``information spectrum''. The ultimate 
     objective of this level of information warfare would be to 
     render physical conflict ``either unnecessary or at worst 
     short, sharp and successful''. At the third level the focus 
     is on any kind of electronic attack upon military or civilian 
     information infrastructures, including criminal hacking (or 
     cracking), data disruption, illegal systems penetration, and 
     also physical destruction, deception and psychological 
     operations. (3)
       7. The Washington based Center for Strategic and 
     International Studies (CSIS) recently published a 
     comprehensive study on these issues and admitted that so many 
     different activities have been classified under the label 
     ``information warfare'' that it is now difficult to 
     understand exactly what it is. Nonetheless, this study 
     classifies information warfare activities according to the 
     source, the form, and the tactical objectives of the 
     attack. Thus, information warfare can be viewed as a 
     combination of these three dimensions.
       8. First, an attack could originate either from outside or 
     from within the targeted organisation or system. Second, four 
     categories of attack can be identified:
       Data attacks are conducted by inserting data into a system 
     to make it malfunction.
       Software attacks, similar to data attacks, are conducted by 
     penetrating systems with software causing failure or making 
     them perform functions different from those intended.
       Hacking or cracking is seizing or attempting to seize 
     control of an information system (or a vital part of it) to 
     disrupt, deny use, steal resources or data, or cause any 
     other kind of harm.
       Physical attacks are the traditional form of attack 
     (bombing, assaulting, and destroying) directed against 
     information systems. An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) produced 
     by nuclear explosions can also be included in this kind of 
     attack.
       9. All these different forms of information warfare attack 
     can be categorised by their goals or tactical objectives: 
     they could be aimed at exploitation, deception, disruption or 
     destruction of information systems. (4)
       10. The French Ministry of Defence has also offered an 
     interesting definition of information warfare. It has singled 
     out three types:
       War for information (guerre pour l'information): to obtain 
     information about the enemy's means, capabilities and 
     strategies in order to defend ourselves;
       War against information (guerre contre l'information): at 
     the same time to protect our information systems and to 
     disrupt or destroy the enemy's.
       War through information (guerre par l'information): to 
     conduct misinformation or deception operations against the 
     enemy in order to achieve ``information dominance''. (5)
       11. All the above are accurate and acceptable definitions, 
     but for the sake of clarity we can try to summarise them into 
     a simpler and more limited formula. Information warfare could 
     be then defined as defensive and offensive operations, 
     conducted by individuals or structured organisations with 
     specific political and strategic goals, for the exploitation, 
     disruption or destruction of data contained in computers or 
     transmitted over the Internet and other networked information 
     systems. (6)

                        B. Assessing the Threat

       12. In general terms, a threat can be defined as the 
     combination of a capability and a hostile intent. According 
     to many analysts, the reason for concern about attacks upon 
     information systems, or information warfare, is that the 
     means of offence are widely available, inexpensive and easy 
     to use. In a world where even governments and the military 
     tend to rely on computer hardware and software available 
     commercially off-the-shelf (COTS), virtually anybody with a 
     computer and the technical skills could become a cracker or a 
     cyberterrorist. Moreover, the progress in information 
     technology makes the electronic tools available to conduct 
     such attacks more sophisticated every day and, through the 
     Internet and the interlinked computer world, easier to 
     acquire. But the most potentially dangerous feature of 
     information warfare is that it can be conducted from anywhere 
     in the world and the possibilities of discovering the 
     attack's origin, or even its presence, are extremely 
     difficult.
       13. Who can conduct such attacks? A recent analysis has 
     listed the potential ``enemies'' according to the levels of 
     threat. At the lower level are the crackers, or ``hackers 
     with malicious intentions'', sometimes highly knowledgeable 
     in technical matters and very determined, but often isolated 
     and without a clear political agenda. Then we have some 
     pressure groups, organisations that fight for specific 
     political causes and might decide to acquire the technology 
     in order to attack the information systems of other 
     organisations or even of states. Terrorists come next in the 
     scale: some groups are becoming increasingly sophisticated in 
     the use of technology and can conduct strategic offensive 
     information warfare. At the highest level are the states, 
     many of which now have access to extremely sophisticated 
     technology and can acquire the necessary organisational 
     infrastructure to conduct both offensive and defensive 
     information warfare. In fact, some experts doubt the 
     effectiveness, capability, or even willingness of the non-
     state actors to conduct attacks that can seriously threaten 
     other nations' security. (7)
       14. In the last fifteen years, both the private and public 
     sectors' information systems have been subjected to attacks 
     that have substantially increased with the growth of the 
     Internet. Computer viruses have been a primary concern of 
     information security experts. These are generally very small 
     programmes, often with destructive capabilities, designed to 
     invade computer systems or individual PCs by attaching 
     themselves to other bits of executable programme codes. 
     Created by hackers, computer science students or disgruntled 
     programmers, these viruses have been extremely destructive to 
     many computers and networks, but have not proved to be 
     particularly effective as weapons to date. Because of their 
     non-professional origins, the viruses often contain errors 
     and, moreover, their authors are often incapable of 
     envisioning the complexity and variety of the systems they 
     are attacking.
       15. Of course, it is still possible that a state or a 
     terrorist group can assemble a team of experts capable of 
     creating malicious viruses and using them to conduct 
     information warfare attacks. But computer viruses are 
     extremely unpredictable and far from precise in their 
     behaviour, and they might eventually damage the attacker 
     as much as the victim. In addition, the international 
     anti-virus industry is mature and is well positioned to 
     create necessary antidotes to almost any new virus.
       16. Other, more dangerous attacks on information systems 
     have been conducted by criminal hacking intruders. Private 
     corporations, particularly in the financial sector, are 
     regularly penetrated by cybercriminals: the FBI estimates 
     that these electronic intrusions cause yearly losses of about 
     $10 billion in the United States alone. This is probably only 
     the tip of the iceberg. In fact, concerns about protecting 
     shareholder value and customer confidence may keep many firms 
     from reporting all the attacks to law enforcement agencies.
       17. Electronic intrusions into the military information 
     infrastructure cause deep concern in the United States. 
     According to the

[[Page H8075]]

     CSIS, probe attacks against the Pentagon number in the tens 
     of thousands every year. John J. Hamre, Deputy Secretary of 
     Defense, recently stated that from January to mid-November 
     1998, the National Security Agency (NSA) recorded more than 
     3,800 incidents of intrusion attempts against the Defense 
     Department's unclassified computer systems and networks. Over 
     100 of these attacks reached root-level access and many were 
     even able to break down some kinds of service. This reflects 
     only what has been reported to NSA, but ``the actual number 
     of intrusions probably is considerably higher''. (8)
       18. The literature and the chronicles are full of examples 
     of successful network intrusions at the US Department of 
     Defense (DoD) and other Western defence institutions. One of 
     the most interesting is the break-in at the Air Force's 
     Laboratories in the town of Rome, in New York State, when two 
     British boys hacked into the system with the help of what is 
     called a ``sniffer'' programme, able to capture passwords and 
     user log-ins to the network. The case served as a learning 
     experience for the Air Force Information Warfare Center, 
     which then developed the advanced technical skills to counter 
     these intrusions. Similar hacker intrusions are regularly 
     experienced by all other US military services and government 
     agencies.
       19. While most of the attacks in the last few years were 
     generally conducted by individuals or by small groups of 
     intruders, with little or no political purpose, recently some 
     cases suggested the possibility of state-sponsored hacking or 
     cracking. Additionally, some anti-state, politically 
     motivated activity has occurred. In October 1998, China 
     launched a new website to publicise its efforts in human 
     rights. A few days later, hackers replaced the home page of 
     that site with a message condemning Beijing for its poor 
     record in human rights. (9)
       20. Another, more revealing case occurred in Ireland, where 
     refugees from East Timor had set up a website to protest 
     against the occupation of their country by Indonesia. The 
     Irish Internet provider even created a new domain name 
     ``.tp'', as if East Timor were an independent country. In 
     January 1999, a concerted attack against the East Timorese 
     server started, originating from 18 different places as far 
     apart as Australia, the United States, Japan, the Netherlands 
     and Canada. The attackers managed to render the web server 
     useless and forced the Irish provider to disconnect its 
     entire system. Clearly, this was not an ordinary cracker 
     intrusion, though many doubt that the Indonesian government 
     had the capability to conduct such a concerted information 
     warfare action. The most probable culprit is a group of 
     politicised hackers sympathetic with the Indonesian position. 
     (10)
       21. The NATO information system was also indirectly 
     threatened in October 1998, when a Serbian group of hackers 
     known as Black Hand penetrated a Kosovo Albanian web server 
     and threatened to sabotage the Alliance's information system. 
     The organisation temporarily closed all foreign access to its 
     web server and its web site was down for two days. Realising 
     that the electronic defences of the NATO web server were 
     extremely weak, experts took some countermeasures, which 
     proved to be insufficient in the light of subsequent events. 
     (11)
       22. During the Kosovo crisis, hackers attacked the NATO web 
     site, causing a line saturation of the server by using a 
     ``bombardment strategy''. The organisation had to defend 
     itself from macro viruses from FRY trying to corrupt its e-
     mail system, which was also being saturated by one individual 
     sending 2,000 messages a day. These attacks were possible 
     because NATO was using the same server for the e-mail system 
     and its web-pages. When these tasks are done by separate 
     servers, as is now the case at NATO, the threat is reduced. 
     Allied governments' web sites have also been targeted during 
     the war, and according to US Air Force sources the attacks 
     came not only from FRY, but also from Russia and China. It is 
     unclear, however, whether these attacks were state-sponsored 
     or the work of groups of hackers. Conversely, FRY's 
     information systems were severely damaged by NATO bombings 
     and electronic operations--although Belgrade itself 
     dismantled communication systems to deprive its people of 
     outside information. In addition, thousands of Western 
     civilian hackers conducted online attacks against the FRY 
     government's web servers. (12)
       23. Such cases might not prove the existence of state-
     sponsored information warfare or cyberterrorism, but they 
     offer good examples of what could happen if the capability is 
     coupled with a hostile intent. The subsequent question is: 
     could a group of state-sponsored terrorists or individual 
     crackers damage the information infrastructure of another 
     nation so as to cause a major strategic disruption? The US 
     Department of Defense seems to think so.
       24. In the summer of 1997, a simulation exercise called 
     ``Eligible Receiver'' was conducted at the Pentagon, ordered 
     by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to test the ability of the 
     nation's military and civilian infrastructure to resist 
     a concerted information warfare attack. A team of 
     fictional hackers, the Red Team, was allowed to use only 
     COTS materiel and information available on the Web and had 
     to act within the US law. So far, the results of this 
     exercise remain strictly ``top secret''. Nonetheless, many 
     officials have referred to it in public declarations and 
     some have partially revealed the outcome. James Adams, a 
     journalist based in Washington DC, claimed in a book to 
     have interviewed senior officials about ``Eligible 
     Receiver'': ``The [simulated] attacks focused on three 
     main areas: the national information infrastructure, the 
     military leadership and the political leadership. In each 
     of these three areas, the hackers found it exceptionally 
     easy to penetrate apparently well-defended systems. Air 
     traffic control systems were taken down, power grids made 
     to fail, oil refineries stopped pumping--all initially 
     apparent incidents. At the same time, in response to a 
     hypothetical international crisis, the Defense department 
     was moving to deploy forces overseas and the logistics 
     network was swinging into action. It proved remarkably 
     easy to disrupt that network by changing orders and 
     interrupt[ing] the logistics flow. The hackers began to 
     feed false news reports into the decision-making process 
     so that the politicians faced a lack of public will about 
     prosecuting a potential conflict and lacked detailed and 
     accurate information.'' (13)
       25. In conclusion, according to Adams' sources, a team of 
     skilled hackers, using standard equipment and publicly 
     available information and playing by the rules, was able to 
     cause a ``serious degradation of the Pentagon's ability to 
     deploy and to fight''. In other words, they demonstrated that 
     an ``electronic Pearl Harbor'' was possible.
       26. Many things have changed in the last two years due to 
     the fast pace of progress in information technology. 
     Moreover, the policies and actions taken by the US government 
     may have reduced the vulnerability of the nation's 
     infrastructure. Nonetheless, if technology is helping Western 
     governments establish better defences, it also helps 
     potential enemies improve their capabilities to attack. A 
     recently announced new breed of hacker software, that can 
     learn and adapt to the network environment it attacks, may 
     represent a new threat. According to information technology 
     experts, the new programmes can change their mode of 
     operation, or their targets, based on external stimulants. 
     Pre-programmed to search for specific types of files common 
     to most networks, such software, once in the system, can 
     target data or files of interest to the intruders, even those 
     marked secure or for internal use only. (14)
       27. In addition, many nations are trying to acquire the 
     capabilities needed to conduct information warfare operations 
     and new terrorist groups like Osama bin Laden's are known to 
     use computers and satellite telecommunications. China has 
     recently intensified its information warfare programmes, both 
     to protect its own military infrastructures and to enable the 
     People's Liberation Army to conduct electronic attacks. 
     According to James Mulvenon, a defence specialist at Rand 
     Corporation, Beijing ``is seeking the ability both to 
     interfere with Taiwan's command system, and ultimately to 
     `hack' into US military networks which control deployment in 
     the Asian region.'' (15)
       28. A serious physical threat to information systems can be 
     posed by the effects of the electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) 
     produced by nuclear explosions. The immediate energy release 
     from a detonated nuclear device produces intense, rapidly 
     varying electric and magnetic fields that can extend for 
     considerable distances and severely affect all electronic 
     equipment and electrical or radar transmissions even to the 
     point of destroying equipment circuits, microprocessors, and 
     other components. Therefore, a single, very high-altitude 
     nuclear blast above Europe or the United States, which may 
     cause no physical damage to structures or people, could 
     disable or disrupt all non-hardened information systems. 
     While few nations currently have both nuclear weapons and the 
     missiles capable of delivering them in space, the increasing 
     number of ``rogue'' nations with nuclear weapons that are 
     also developing or acquiring long-range missiles may present 
     an extremely serious EMP threat in the near future.
       29. EMP effects from nuclear explosions and non-nuclear 
     weapons, such as HERP (High-Energy Radio Frequency) guns or 
     EMP/T (Electro-Magnetic Pulses Transformer) bombs, may be 
     much more dangerous for civilian information systems than for 
     military ones, most of which are now EMP hardened. Shielding 
     of iron or other materials such as copper mesh or non-
     magnetic metals is generally available only for the 
     protection of sensitive military technology.


                      III. RESPONSES TO THE THREAT

       30. Efforts to respond to the threat of attacks to 
     information systems, or information warfare, have been made 
     by many nations. Generally, the military and defence ``think 
     tanks'' have been the first to address the issue, but now 
     most Western governments have taken steps towards more co-
     ordinated and structured responses.
       31. In the United States, different panels, commissions and 
     study groups have been examining these issues since the early 
     1990s and the government has taken several important 
     measures. Congressional Committees have held hearings to 
     investigate the nature of the information warfare threat. The 
     National Defense University has extensively worked on the 
     issue since the early 1990s. However, the most comprehensive 
     appraisal of the nation's vulnerabilities in the field of 
     information technology has been provided by the Presidential 
     Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, created in 
     1996, involving officials from the energy, defence, commerce 
     and law enforcement areas, as well as representatives of 
     the private sector. After 15 months of study, the

[[Page H8076]]

     Commission published an extensive report highlighting the 
     vulnerabilities of the US infrastructure and the weakness 
     of the information systems, which proved to be a 
     potentially easy target for any concerted attack. The 
     report also indicated that government and industry do not 
     efficiently share information that might give warning of 
     an electronic attack and that the federal R&D budget does 
     not include the analysis of the threats to the information 
     systems in the infrastructure. (16)
       32. The work of the Presidential Commission resulted in the 
     issuing in May 1998 of two Presidential Decision Directives, 
     62 and 63, on Critical Infrastructure Protection. The 
     provisions of these Directives included:
       Interagency co-ordination for critical infrastructure 
     protection;
       Definition of the roles and responsibilities of US agencies 
     in fighting terrorism;
       Improvements in capabilities for protecting the national 
     information structure, the most important of which is the 
     creation of a National Infrastructure Protection Center 
     (NIPC) in the FBI;
       Promotion of partnerships with industry and other private 
     players to enhance computer security;
       Study of plans for minimising damage and recovering rapidly 
     from attacks to its vital infrastructures.
       33. Some experts criticised the US administration 
     decisions, claiming that the above provisions underestimated 
     the realities of the information warfare threat. Nonetheless 
     this is the most comprehensive and complete initiative taken 
     so far by any Western government to respond to the risks of 
     attacks on information systems.
       34. Moreover, the DoD, actively participating in the 
     government initiatives, has recently created a Joint Task 
     Force for Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND) to co-ordinate 
     all the activities in this field and direct the Pentagon's 
     response to computer network attacks. The JTF-CND will plan 
     defensive measures, leverage existing capabilities and 
     develop procedures for the military commanders-in-chief, 
     services and agencies, as well as provide strategic focus at 
     all levels. Fully operational in the summer of 1999, the JTF-
     CND will also develop relationships with intelligence and law 
     enforcement agencies, the NIPC and the private sector. (17)
       35. Among European nations, France appears to have 
     developed a coherent strategy to deal with attacks on 
     information systems. In the absence of a general programme 
     for infrastructure protection, such as that in the United 
     States, the Delegation generale pour l'armement (DGA) of the 
     Ministry of Defence has concentrated technical activities in 
     the field of information warfare at the Centre d'electronique 
     de l'armement (CELAR). This centre employs some 900 experts 
     in many scientific and technological areas, and has resources 
     and capabilities with probably no equal on the continent. All 
     CELAR activities are related to information warfare (guerre 
     de l'information), defensive and offensive, and are divided 
     into five tasks: weapon systems for electronic warfare, 
     information security, information systems, 
     telecommunications, and electronic components. CELAR analyses 
     the threats, establishes the needs, and tests the proficiency 
     and the limits of the systems and equipment. In particular, 
     within the information security field of CELAR, the Centre de 
     l'armement pour la securite des systemes d'information 
     (CASSI), is responsible for the development of all security 
     programmes and strategies in the Ministry of Defence and acts 
     as a consultant for other ministries and governmental 
     agencies. (18)
       36. In Germany, the efforts of the Government and the 
     Bundestag to address the problem of security in information 
     technology led to the creation, in 1991, of a Federal Agency 
     for Security in Information Technology (Bundesamt fur 
     Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, or BSI). The BSI is 
     responsible for assessing the risks and developing the 
     criteria, tools and procedures to assure the security of 
     vital information systems. However, according to German 
     officials, the BSI has concentrated its work on the non-
     military aspects of information warfare. In other words, it 
     has considered the possibility of attacks to information 
     systems only in the civilian field. At the same time, the 
     German military has conducted some studies on information 
     warfare and has recently initiated a new one, called 
     ``2020'', which will consider the future evolution of the 
     topic. Recently, a working group has been created at a 
     federal level to draft a policy paper on ``Information 
     Warfare and IT Security'', aimed at reaching a better co-
     ordination within the civilian and military fields.
       37. The UK Ministry of Defence has addressed, in various 
     areas, the problems related to information warfare, 
     recognising that ``the potential vulnerabilities and risks 
     arising from `information warfare' go much wider than the 
     Armed Forces and the defence infrastructure'' (19). The MoD 
     is therefore known to be working with other areas of 
     Government, allies and suppliers of key services to co-
     ordinate security policies and find technical solutions to 
     protect the nation's infrastructure.
       38. Other countries, such as Finland, Norway, Sweden and 
     Switzerland have taken initiatives similar to those of the 
     United States. Australia, Canada and Israel are investing in 
     studies of defensive measures and approaches (20). NATO has 
     recently analysed the threats of information warfare attacks 
     and given indications to member states. For the moment, the 
     most relevant studies conducted by the Alliance on the 
     subject are classified.


        IV. Information warfare or simplY Information Security?

       39. As it is often the case with extensively debated 
     issues, some defence analysts and information security 
     experts are doubting the actual size of the information 
     warfare threat as it is presented by the media and even by 
     some official reports. They contend that newspapers and 
     magazines report stories about dangerous viruses, violated 
     military websites and crackers penetrating corporate 
     information systems in distorted and exaggerated ways. 
     Some also list errors and overstatements included in 
     official documents and defence studies. Fairness demands 
     that we also consider these points of view, and below we 
     summarise the most salient issues.
       40. In 1997, for instance, a US government commission, that 
     included former directors of the CIA and the National 
     Reconnaissance Office, warned against a virus contained in an 
     e-mail message entitled ``Penpal Greetings''. According to 
     the commission's report, the virus ``could infect the hard-
     drive and destroy all data present''. Moreover, the virus was 
     reportedly ``self-replicating'' and ``would automatically 
     forward itself to any e-mail address stored in the 
     recipient's in-box.'' According to many computer security 
     analysts, the report was wrong and the Penpal virus was in 
     fact a hoax. However, more recently several viruses spreading 
     by e-mail could nonetheless perform extremely destructive 
     actions. (21)
       41. In March 1999, a type of macro virus propagating by e-
     mail called Melissa damaged, according to many journalistic 
     sources, more than 100,000 computers. Hidden within a file of 
     a popular word processing software, Melissa affected its 
     security settings, rendering personal computers vulnerable to 
     further attacks. While some defence leaders, experts on 
     terrorism, lawmen and software executives hailed ``another 
     warning siren of the vulnerability of our networks'' or even 
     ``a demonstration of what an electronic Pearl Harbor might 
     look like'', most computer security people defined Melissa as 
     ``just another dangerous virus'', no more sophisticated than 
     prior ones using the identical modus operandi. Moreover, they 
     contended, Melissa (although very costly to many businesses) 
     had no noticeable effect on Internet use or stock markets or 
     electronic commerce. They also noted that most persons using 
     the web on a regular basis would not open an unknown file 
     attachment received by e-mail, especially if reportedly it 
     contained a list of pornographic websites. (22)
       42. But computer scientists and IT security experts are not 
     only highlighting general misinformation and myths about 
     viruses. They contest as well the alarming figures suggesting 
     that the Pentagon and other US vital infrastructures are 
     under almost permanent attack by crackers or cyberterrorists. 
     They admit that malefactors can break into military and 
     civilian web servers, and maybe even cause serious damage, 
     but that it is far from representing an ``electronic Pearl 
     Harbor'' for the United States. As Kevin Ziese, the computer 
     scientist who led the Rome Laboratories investigation, and 
     other experts put it, these break-ins can be defined as the 
     virtual equivalent of a ``kid walking into the Pentagon 
     cafeteria.'' (23)
       43. Equating computer viruses and hacker software with 
     weapons of mass destruction, many analysts insist, is 
     overreaching. And classifying them as such would be like 
     considering teen hackers or virus creators equivalent to 
     terrorists or ``rogue'' states. The recent attacks on the 
     Alliance's information system during the Kosovo crisis, 
     according to these sources, might have proved just that. In 
     fact, they report that computer security experts in the US 
     Department of Defense were ``completely unimpressed by 
     whatever it was Serbian hackers did during the Yugoslavian 
     war. The worst it did is make the NATO administrator of the 
     site work a little harder. It didn't have any impact on the 
     Yugoslavian war at all.'' (24)
       44. With regard to the supposedly frightening results of 
     the ``Eligible Receiver'' exercise, which are still 
     considered ``sensitive information'' by the Pentagon, many 
     object that they should be opened up to an independent audit. 
     Until then, computer scientists declare that they will remain 
     extremely sceptical. Moreover, they say the Pentagon's 
     position is in stark contrast to the wide-open discussions of 
     computer security vulnerabilities that reign on the Internet.
       45. According to William M. Arkin, an army veteran, defence 
     analyst and editor of US Military Online, the excessive 
     secrecy in the Pentagon's attitude towards information 
     security reflects a basic misjudgement of the power of the 
     Internet and the ability of the military to control it. A 
     directive issued on 24 September 1998 by Deputy Defense 
     Secretary John Hamre instructed all military services and 
     agencies to ``ensure national security is not compromised or 
     personnel placed at risk'' by information available on 
     military websites. In fact, the Pentagon has for years had 
     policies that required just that, and therefore only 
     unclassified information has ever been made available on the 
     Internet. John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists 
     agrees with Arkin that the DoD issued this new policy out of 
     ``a desire to show vigilance, coupled with a profound lack of 
     understanding of information and computer security'', rather 
     than because of

[[Page H8077]]

     any new threats coming from the Internet. (25)
       46. Many experts and scientists are critical of the 
     approach taken by some of the Pentagon leaders not because 
     they believe there are no threats coming from cyberspace, but 
     because they feel those threats might have been overstated or 
     mystified through what they call ``info-warrior rhetoric''. 
     Computer security analysts, who have been working on these 
     problems for years, have the impression that ``information 
     warfare'' might just be old wine in new bottles. In fact, 
     many of the activities now classified under this definition 
     could be traditional intelligence work, intelligence analyses 
     through the Internet or psychological operations and 
     deception. For instance, the US Air Force Information Warfare 
     Center (AFIWC, part of the Air Intelligence Agency) in San 
     Antonio and other similar organisations are the equivalent of 
     computer emergency response teams, and the military and 
     civilians employed in them are all computer security 
     specialists.
       47. In spite of these reservations, it is clear that there 
     are many serious threats. In sum, according to George Smith, 
     editor of The Crypt Newsletter, an Internet publication 
     dealing with computer security for computer analysts: ``It is 
     far from proven that the country [i.e., the United States] 
     is at the mercy of possible devastating computerized 
     attacks. On the other hand, even the small number of 
     examples of malicious behaviour demonstrate that computer 
     security issues in our increasingly technological world 
     will be of primary concern well into the foreseeable 
     future.''


                             V. CONCLUSION

       48. It is clear, even from the words of the most sceptical 
     analysts, that the security of information systems must be a 
     high priority for any nation. With the increasing dependence 
     on information technologies, all our vital infrastructures 
     are potentially vulnerable to some sort of external attack. 
     Even if experts disagree on the extent and the nature of the 
     threat, we need nonetheless to adopt measures to strengthen 
     the protection of our information systems.
       49. The first priority should be to seek objectivity in the 
     assessment of the real threats. An independent group should 
     be set up to provide such assessment, maybe at the 
     international level. An example is provided by the G-8 High 
     Tech Crime Group, a multilateral forum seeking to enhance 
     transnational co-operation in investigating and prosecuting 
     criminal misuse and exploitation of information systems. 
     Parliaments and governments, as well as the industry, the 
     scientific community and computer security experts should 
     work within a similar group focused on information warfare 
     threats in order to share their knowledge and competence and 
     analyse the subject from different perspectives. A serious 
     evaluation of the claims of computer security software and 
     hardware producers could be the first task of such a group.
       50. Programmes to raise public awareness and encourage 
     education in the field of computer security and 
     infrastructure protection would be extremely useful, and they 
     should cover all possible audiences. They should include 
     conferences, university studies, presentations at industry 
     associations and professional societies, and sponsorship of 
     graduate studies and programmes. In addition, research 
     efforts are needed to both substantially improve and deploy 
     more widely the existing technology. In particular, new 
     capabilities for detection and identification of intrusion 
     and improved simulation and modelling capability to 
     understand the effects upon interconnected and interdependent 
     infrastructures would be beneficial.
       51. The law has to keep pace with the development of new 
     technologies. Parliaments can play an important role in 
     reconsidering and readapting the laws regulating 
     infrastructure protection and information systems assurance. 
     The United States can provide some good examples in terms of 
     both statutes and case law and the Justice Department has a 
     section devoted to this area. However, due to the open and 
     global nature of the Internet, this effort should involve 
     computer security experts and legislators internationally. In 
     fact, creating a specific international set of rules or 
     conventions is an essential prerequisite for establishing a 
     credible and efficient Internet economy.
       52. Intelligence can also contribute to a clearer 
     understanding of the new threats of the information age in 
     terms of actors, motives, and capabilities. Of course, the 
     traditional intelligence work and organisation, developed 
     during the Cold War, must be adapted to the new environment. 
     Intelligence officials in all nations must reconsider their 
     methods for information acquisition and rely on new sources. 
     National agencies must also start recruiting special talents 
     familiar with the new threats, such as skilled computer 
     analysts with a direct experience of hacking methods.
       53. Since most experts agree that commercial information 
     systems are now more vulnerable to external attacks, it is 
     essential to foster public-private co-operation. Much of the 
     information that private companies need to protect their 
     information systems may be available from the defence, 
     intelligence and law enforcement communities. Often the 
     private sector can better identify, understand and evaluate 
     the threats. In many countries, co-operation between 
     industries and their governments could be extremely helpful 
     to share ``information and techniques related to risk 
     management assessment, including incident reports, 
     identification of weak spots, plans and technology to prevent 
     attacks and disruptions, and plans for how to recover from 
     them.'' Of course, public-private collaboration also has its 
     limits, such as classified and secret materials or 
     proprietary and competitively sensitive information.
       54. Finally, in most Western countries, but particularly in 
     the United States, the military should address many questions 
     concerning the effective role of the information warfare 
     programmes in their general policy. Programmes like those 
     going under the definition of ``Revolution in Military 
     Affairs'' (RMA) have already tried to assess the future 
     impact that the use of information technology could have on 
     weapon systems and on military organisation and strategy. 
     However, the US military still needs to clarify its policy 
     about the options for deterring an attack on vital 
     information systems and the possible use of offensive 
     information warfare. The link between information warfare and 
     other military strategies should be better articulated: for 
     instance, would it be possible to respond to an information 
     warfare attack with conventional forces? Moreover, the 
     possibility that the United States (or any other Western 
     country) would develop and deploy offensive information 
     warfare techniques has not been adequately discussed in 
     public forums. This can be essential in order to build a 
     national and possibly international consensus about the role 
     of offensive information warfare and to clearly define its 
     policies of use.

                          Notes and References

       1. Lord Lyell, Lothar Ibrugger, Information Warfare and the 
     Millennium Bomb, General Report, NAA Science and Technology 
     Committee [AP 237 STC (97) 7]
       2. Definition found on the website of the Institute for the 
     Advanced Study of Information Warfare, self-defined ``a 
     virtual non-governmental organisation'', http://
     www.psycom.net/iwar.1.html
       3. Dr. Andrew Rathmell, ``Information Warfare: Implications 
     for Arms Control'', Bulletin of Arms Control, No. 29, April 
     1998, on the web page of King's College London, http://
     www.kcl.ac.uk/orgs/icsa/cds.html. With regard to the 
     Revolution of Military Affairs, see the STC 1998 General 
     Report on the subject [AR 299 STC (98) 6]
       4. Cybercrime-Cyberterrorism-Cyberwarfare, Averting an 
     Electronic Waterloo, CSIS Task Force Report, Center for 
     Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 1998, pp. 
     9-11.
       5. Col Jean-Luc Moliner, ``La guerre de l'information vue 
     par un operationnel francais'', L'Armement, No. 60, Dec. 
     1997-Jan. 1998, p. 11
       6. Information warfare should be limited to ``specific 
     political and strategic goals'' to avoid confusion with 
     cybercrime or industrial espionage. Attacks to private 
     corporations (see para.16) might be included only if 
     conducted as part of political or strategic offensive. The 
     limit to ``Internet and other networked information systems'' 
     helps avoid confusion with espionage cases involving the use 
     (or misuse) of restricted or secret information systems and/
     or data bases (such as recent alleged espionage at DOE 
     weapons laboratories). Lorenzo Valeri, ``Information 
     requirements for Information Warfare: the need for a 
     multidisciplinary approach'', presentation prepared for the 
     1999 InfoWar Conference, 27 May 1999, London; and George 
     Ballantyne, ``www.terrorism.now'', RUSI Newsbrief, April 
     1999, p.31. From letter by John J. Hamre published in Issues 
     in Science and Technology, Winter 1998-99, pp.10-11
       7. Alden M. Hayashi, ``The Net Effect'', Scientific 
     American, January 1999, p. 13
       8. Niall McKay, ``Indonesia, Ireland in Info War?'' Wired 
     News, 27 January 1999, at the website http://www.wired.com/
     news/; Michelle Knott, ``Virtual Warfare'', New Scientist, 27 
     February 1999, p.51
       9. Chris Nuttall, ``Kosovo info warfare spreads'', BBC 
     Online, 1 April 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ and interview 
     with Mr. Chris Scheurweghs of the NATO Integrated Data 
     Service
       10. ``Computer hackers in Belgrade'', Aviation Week & Space 
     Technology, 5 April 1999, p.23; Patrick Riley, ``E-Strikes 
     and Cyber-Sabotage: Civilian Hackers Go Online to Fight'', 
     Fox News, 15 April 1999, http://www.foxnews.com/; Bob Brewin, 
     ``General: Cyberattacks against NATO traced to China'', 
     Federal Computer Week, 1 September 1999, http://www.fcw.com/
       11. James Adams, The Next World War, Hutchinson, London, 
     1998, pp.187-8
       12. George I. Seffers, ``Stealthy New Software Enhances 
     Hacker Arsenal'', Defense News, 15 March 1999, p. 3
       13. Tony Walker and Stephen Fidler, ``China studies 
     computer warfare'', Financial Times, 16 March 1999, p. 4
       14. Information on the Commission, as well as the text of 
     the report are available on the Web at http://www.pccip.gov
       15. George I. Seffers, interview with Maj. Gen. John 
     Campbell, Defense News, 29 March 1999, p.30
       16. Jean-Pierre Meunier, ``Le CELAR, centre technique de la 
     guerre de l'information'', L'Armement, N. 60, Dec. 1997-Jan. 
     1998, pp.84-88
       17. Strategic Defence Review, Chapter 5: The Future Shape 
     of Our Forces, available on the Web at http://www.mod.uk/
     policy/sdr/
       18. Andrew Rathmell, ``Information Warfare and sub-state 
     actors'', Information, Communication & Society, Winter 1998, 
     p. 490
       19. Quoted in George Smith, ``Truth is the first casualty 
     of cyberwar'', The Wall Street Journal, 8 September 1998

[[Page H8078]]

       20. Kurt Kleiner, Matt Walker, ``Melissa's mayhem'', New 
     Scientist, 10 April 1999, p.4; ``The Melissa media 
     hangover'', The Crypt Newsletter, available on the Web at 
     http://sun.soci.niu.edu/crypt/
       21. Quoted in George Smith, ``An Electronic Pearl Harbor? 
     Not Likely'', Issues in Science and Technology, Fall 1998
       22. David Ruppe, ``Cyber Scare'', ABC News, 4 August 1999, 
     available on the Web at http://www.abcnews.go.com/
       23. Daniel G. Dupont, ``Out of Site'', Scientific American, 
     January 1999, p.26
       24. G. Smith, ``An Electronic Pearl Harbor? Not Likely'', 
     Issues in Science and Technology, Fall 1998
       25. C. Paul Robinson, Joan B. Woodard, Samuel G. Varnado, 
     ``Critical Infrastructure: Interlinked and Vulnerable'', 
     Issues in Science and Technology, Fall 1998, p. 63
  In summary, then, this is a very important issue, something that we 
must address not only for security for individuals' privacy, not only 
for privacy and security and integrity in business communications, but 
also as a means of national security. I urge a ``yes'' vote on this 
bill. I look forward to the President signing this bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I would like to thank the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Ehlers) for 
his leadership on this issue and on so many issues on the Committee on 
Science. He has been one of those voices that sees problems before they 
present themselves to the rest of the country and has been an 
outstanding leader on this and many other issues.
  I also want to reiterate my thanks to Chairman Boehlert, Ranking 
Member Hall, the committee staff and my own staff member, Chris 
Schloesser, for their good work on this.
  Coincidentally, a few weeks ago I was messing around with my own 
computer system and I took the hardware firewall off that I have. I 
also have a software firewall. During a brief 15-minute period, five 
attacks from outside were recorded. I say that to mention that it is 
not just government doing its part to provide increased funds, the 
general public will need to increase their level of security and 
awareness that if they have permanent on-line connections and as 
broadband becomes more readily available, the general public has an 
important role to play because those who wish to do our country harm 
will try to get to our secure infrastructure through just average 
citizens' systems and through the network there.
  I also want to underscore what the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
Ehlers) said about the cost of this legislation. It may sound 
expensive, and indeed it is, but the cost of a coordinated attack on 
our information infrastructure would be vast indeed. I would ask people 
to entertain the possibility of what might happen were there to be not 
only an attack from terrorists such as we saw on September 11 but if 
that were coordinated with a cyber attack on our air traffic control 
system or on our emergency communication systems. In an instance like 
that where information flow would be critical and would mean the life 
or death of thousands of Americans, a cyber attack would amplify 
exponentially the cost of a more traditional terrorist kind of attack. 
This money will be well spent. By spending it today, we will prepare 
our country for the kinds of risks we may face tomorrow.
  I again urge passage of H.R. 3394. I commend those who have worked so 
hard to achieve this point. I thank the gentleman for his leadership.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. EHLERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  In response, I want to thank the gentleman from Washington for his 
very perceptive comments on this issue. One important additional point 
to note is that the country with the most sophisticated computer 
systems is also the most vulnerable to information attacks and cyber 
attacks. Therefore, we have the most to gain by engaging in studies of 
cyber security to protect our extremely advanced systems.
  Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Cyber 
Security Research and Development Act, H.R. 3394. The bill is 
substantially the same as the version which was developed in a 
bipartisan manner by the Science Committee and passed by the House 
early in the current session.
  H.R. 3394 fills an important gap in current information technology 
research programs--namely, the need for improved security for our 
computers and digital communication networks.
  I want to congratulate Science Committee Chairman Boehlert for his 
leadership and thank him for working with me in developing the bill.
  I also want to acknowledge my colleague, Mr. Baird, for his important 
contribution to this legislation. The provisions pertaining to the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology originated in his bill, 
H.R. 3316.
  Many systems that are vital to the Nation, such as transportation, 
the electric power grid, and financial services, rely on the transfer 
of information through computer networks. The trend in recent years of 
interconnecting computer networks has had the unintended consequence of 
making access to these critical systems easier for criminals, and 
potentially for terrorists.
  As a result, there have been an increased number of assaults on 
network systems. Computer viruses, attacks by computer hackers, and 
electronic identification theft have become commonplace.
  The tragic events of last year have made us realize just how 
vulnerable we are to attack. We are beginning to understand the 
critical need to protect the Nation's physical and electronic 
infrastructure.
  Testimony before the Science Committee has highlighted a serious 
obstacle to achieving this goal: there are too few scientists and 
engineers engaged in research on information security and too little 
funding for security research. And as federal agencies and private 
industry have found, there are few people with specialized computer 
security skills.
  H.R. 3394 establishes substantial new research programs at the 
National Science Foundation and the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology. The goal of both these multi-year programs is not only to 
advance computer security research, but also to expand the community of 
computer security researchers.
  These programs will support graduate students, post-doctoral 
researchers, and senior researchers, while encouraging stronger ties 
between universities and industry. This industry linkage will provide a 
reality check for research priorities and will facilitate transfer of 
research results into new products and services.
  The research and education programs at the two agencies will be 
reinforcing rather than duplicative. Each agency will use a different 
approach for the competitive review of research applications and for 
managing its research program. NSF and NIST have complementary linkages 
to the academic and industrial research communities, which will ensure 
a broad and varied research portfolio between the two programs.
  Finally, the bill tasks the two agencies to formally coordinate their 
activities, and directs the Office of Science and Technology Policy to 
ensure that all the research activities supported under the bill are 
coordinated with any government-wide cyber security research effort.
  Before I close, I would like to make a few comments about Sections 16 
and 17, which were added to this legislation by the Senate. While I 
don't disagree with the objectives of these provisions, I am concerned 
about the procedures and the haste with which they were added to this 
bill. There was little consultation about the inclusion of Sec. 16 and 
Sec. 17 among the Members involved in drafting this legislation. In 
addition, there was no consultation with the university research 
community or the National Science Foundation, which will be affected by 
these provisions. The haste with which these provisions were drafted 
has resulted in language that is vague and unclear.
  Section 16 could be interpreted as forbidding the National Science 
Foundation from awarding grants or fellowships to institutions of 
higher education or non-profit institutions that materially fail to 
comply with the record-keeping requirements under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility 
Act. However, the record-keeping requirements for these laws have not 
yet been promulgated. Therefore, the effective date for this section 
cannot be the date of enactment. If the research performed under these 
grants is crucial to enhanced information security, the grants program 
should commence immediately; the compliance requirements should take 
effect only after the date of promulgation of the reporting and record-
keeping requirements and after appropriate notice has been given to the 
affected institutions.
  Section 17 requires the Director of the National Science Foundation 
to submit a report to Congress ensuring that awards made under this Act 
are given to individuals and institutions that are in compliance with 
the Immigration and Nationality Act. The National Science Foundation 
has neither the expertise nor responsibilities related to compliance 
with the Immigration and Nationality Act. I assume that the Department 
of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service will ultimately 
certify compliance with the Act. Therefore, section

[[Page H8079]]

17 should only require the NSF report to Congress on information it 
obtains from State and INS. This section should not require the NSF 
Director to commission a duplicative study to secure information 
already held by State and INS.
  I have discussed these issues with Chairman Boehlert and we are in 
agreement in our interpretation of these provisions and the process.
  Mr. Speaker, the key to ensuring information security for the long-
term is to establish a vigorous, creative and sustained basic research 
effort focused on the security of networked information systems. H.R. 
3394 will make a major contribution toward accomplishing this goal. I 
commend this measure to my colleagues and ask for their support for its 
final passage by the House.
  Mr. EHLERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Culberson). The question is on the 
motion offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert) that the 
House suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendment to the bill, 
H.R. 3394.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor 
thereof) the rules were suspended and the Senate amendment was 
concurred in.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________






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