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I.          Introduction


            I am grateful for the opportunity to appear today at the Oversight Hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary (The Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims) on “The Implications of Transnational Terrorism for the Visa Waiver Program.”


            As an institution of the academic community, the International Center for Terrorism Studies based at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies in Arlington, VA, has an intellectual obligation, as well as a moral and practical responsibility, to participate in the efforts by the U.S. Congress to arrest the virus of terrorism.  On a personal level, I have had the privilege of supporting the work of Congress in this important field of public concern for some three decades, including testifying before various congressional committees; providing advice to members of Congress; participating in special research projects with the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA); contributing studies published by Congress; and organizing seminars and briefings for members of Congress and congressional staff.


            With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention two examples of academic-congressional interface in the wake of the September 11 attacks on America.  The first relates to the statement by Delegate Eni Faleomavaega from American Samoa, a ranking member of the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, who inserted in the Congressional Record on September 12, 2001 (page H5512) some of my views on counter-terrorism strategies:


            Mr. Speaker, a noted expert on counterterrorism, Professor Yonah Alexander of the Potomac Institute, has long advocated that the world’s democracies must develop an effective strategy to face this terrible challenge against international terrorism.  Professor Alexander notes, and I quote, “The only light at the end of the tunnel is for a number of nation states and responsible governments to take concerted action against terrorism.  Terrorism against one is terrorism against all, regardless of the blood spilled.  It is the same red blood.  To combat terrorism, no country can deal with this unilaterally without cooperation and support from others.”


            Unless a global strategy can be worked out, Professor Alexander concludes that the existence of civilization itself is seriously at risk.


            Subsequently, I have elaborated on some of these aspects at a forum held on December 4, 2001, on “Terrorism and Homeland Defense: Where Do We Go From Here?” organized by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies with the participation of Representative Jane Harman (D-CA), Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security; Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA), Chairman, Military Procurement Subcommittee; and my colleague Mr. Michael S. Swetnam, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and member of the Technical Advisory Group to the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.


Some of the relevant comments that I have made at this forum have been incorporated in my statement before your subcommittee. My focus today is to briefly present an overview of the threat of conventional and unconventional terrorism, describe the nature of the challenges in Europe with Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaida network in the region and its links to the United States, and offer some implications for the Visa Waiver Policy.



II.        The Threat of Modern Terrorism


            Scores of countries have experienced sporadic and relentless subnational and government-sponsored terrorism in the post-World War II period.  Epitomizing the state of anarchy of contemporary life and increasingly becoming a universal nightmare, terrorism includes: kidnapping of businesspeople, assassination of political leaders, bombing of embassies, and hijacking of aircraft.  Modern terrorism, in contrast to its older features, has introduced a new breed of warfare in terms of threats, technology, victimization, and responses.


            Perhaps the most significant dangers that evolve from modern day terrorism are those relating to the safety, welfare, and rights of ordinary people; stability of the state system; health of economic development; expansion of democracy; and possibly survival of civilization itself. And yet, on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned to witness the unprecedented drama of terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation’s commercial and military powers.


            Thus, despite the end of the Cold War and the evolving era of the New World Order, terrorism remains as threatening as ever. Undoubtedly, conflicts emerging from ideological, religious, and national animosities will continue to make terrorism a global problem well into the twenty-first century.  The vulnerability of modern society and its infrastructure, coupled with the opportunities for the utilization of sophisticated high-leverage conventional and unconventional weaponry, requires states, both unilaterally and in concert, to develop credible responses and capabilities to minimize future threats.


            Ensuring the safety and interests of its citizens at home and abroad will therefore continue to be every government’s paramount responsibility in the coming months and years. Understanding the methods of operation employed by terrorists, identifying the threats and specific targets, both present and future, and knowing the damage and consequences that may result from acts of terror violence will assist governments, with the help of private industry, in responding to the reality of terrorism.


III.       Terrorism and Europe: A Historical Overview


            Terrorism— the unlawful use of physical force and psychological intimidation by substate or clandestine state agents against noncombatant targets, primarily intended to achieve social, economic, political, strategic, or other objectives is not new to Europe. In the Middle Ages, several European maritime states employed pirates to terrorize the seas and further specific foreign policy aims. The “reign of terror” from “above” and “below” became a common practice during the French Revolution.


            In the nineteenth century, a broad spectrum of indigenous European groups, ranging from anarchists to national extremists, resorted to violent activities to attain some “higher goals.” The assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 is one example of this kind of terrorism. In the twentieth century, the murder of the Austrian archduke in Sarajevo by a Serbian extremist ignited the First World War.  The period between the two world wars also witnessed terrorist activities in Europe, with the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia as a case in point.






            It was not, however, until the 1960s that terrorism became a permanent fixture of life in Europe. The Paris student revolt in 1968, the emergence of indigenous separatist movements, the rise of Palestinian extremism, and the expansion of state terrorism by countries, such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya,


the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Bulgaria, are some of the contributing factors that encouraged the intensification of terrorism in Europe.


            During the past forty years hundreds of indigenous, subnational groups, mostly acting independently and sometimes as proxies of foreign governments, have proliferated in Europe.  Seeking to achieve ideological, nationalist, or other goals, these groups include such major and minor actors as

the Armenian (ASALA), Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), Combatant Communist Cells (CCC), Direct Action (DA), First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group (GRAPO), Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Red Army Faction (RAF), Red Brigades (RB), Revolutionary Cells (RZ), and the Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 N).


            These urban terrorist groups— some highly structured (e.g., Red Brigades) and others loosely organized (e.g., CCC)— have either deliberately selected their targets or indiscriminately attacked their victims: Europeans and others.


            To be sure, various European groups collaborated with each other as well as with non-European organizations, primarily those based in the Middle East, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and in Asia, such as the Japanese Red Army. This informal and formal relationship included ideological alliances, propaganda support, diplomatic assistance, intelligence, weapons supply, and operations. For instance, the terrorist team that carried out the 1975 raid on the Organization of

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) headquarters in Vienna consisted of two German terrorists, several Palestinians, and the infamous Carlos, or “The Jackal,” who was operating on behalf of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).


            Clearly, European groups also benefited from indirect and direct state support. Suffice to mention the help provided by the State Security Service (Stasi) of the German Democratic Republic to the Red Army Faction (RAF) in the 1980s.


            Similarly, Bulgaria, through its National Intelligence Service and the National Service for the Protection of the Constitution, extended help to a variety of foreign terrorist groups from the Middle East (e.g., Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq) and from North Africa (e.g., Algeria) operating in Europe.  This help included not only financial assistance and arms supply, but also logistical aid in drug smuggling operations.


            Thus, as a result of European-based ideological and political causes, coupled with external state and substate linkages, indigenous groups resorted to physical and psychological extralegal violence as a weapon against established regimes. It is not surprising, therefore, that, since the 1970s, Europe became one of the most terrorist-prone regions in the world.


            In the 1980s Europe again ranked high on the terrorists’ map.  Tragically, the positive political-military developments in Europe in 1989 and 1990— particularly the tearing down of the Berlin Wall,



the democratization of Eastern European countries, and even the apparent end of the Cold War— have not diminished the threat of terrorism in the region.


            Although during the 1980s and the 1990s Europe moved toward economic and political unification, the region without borders offered new security vulnerabilities to determined indigenous and foreign terrorist groups. In the first place, many of the outstanding roots of domestic conflict (e.g., ETA

in Spain) as well as external problems (e.g., the Middle East) remained. Second, new terrorist dangers were created by the forces of nationalism and ethnic assertiveness unleashed with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia.


            Admittedly, by 2000 Western Europe had the largest decline in the number of international terrorist incidents of any region.  Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, it became increasingly evident that Europe emerged once again as a major base for terrorist operations in the region and beyond.


            The network of al-Qaida in Europe provides an elaborate infrastructure for an escalation of violence with dire consequences to the security interests of the United States and its friends and allies.


IV.       International Network: An Overview


            Experience over the past three decades shows that terrorist groups thrive on collaboration across national boundaries. Shared ideologies and commitments to radical strategies, such as professed struggles against capitalism, imperialism, racism, Zionism, and democracies, motivate groups to work together on an international scale.


            The informal and formal relationships among various terrorist groups and state sponsors have resulted in a national, regional, and global framework for terror. The international character of many terrorist efforts often compounds the difficulty of identifying the initiator or sponsor of a given terrorist act. The Abu Nidal Organization, for example, has received safe haven, financial aid, training, logistical assistance, and other help, including selected operational support from Iraq, Libya, and Syria.


            An interesting aspect of terrorist networks is the formation of a “regional” framework within which like-minded groups collaborate. A case in point is the European “anti-imperialist” network that consisted of several Marxist-Leninist groups, such as the Red Army Faction, Direct Action, and the Red Brigades.


            Substantial state-sponsored support of terrorist groups, particularly by the former Soviet Union and other Eastern European nations, has decreased while international counter-terrorist efforts have increased in scope and effectiveness. As a result, many subnational perpetrators will find it more critical than ever to develop stronger linkages.


            Currently, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaida is the most elaborate international network operating in Europe and elsewhere.


            As we know, the September 11 catastrophic attacks were connected to al-Qaida (the Base).  Al-Qaida (also known as the International Front for the Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, the Group for the



Preservation of the Holy Sites, and the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places) operates in some sixty countries.  Al-Qaida seeks to “unite all Muslims and establish a government which follows the rule of the Caliphs.”


            To achieve al-Qaida’s goal, Muslim regimes, viewed as corrupted by Western influence, must be overthrown by force.  Since in the viewpoint of bin Laden the United States supports corrupt governments, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, he declared “jihad” (Holy War) against the “Great Satan” (the United States).  Bin Laden’s disdain for the United States also stems from the U.S. presence of

troops in Saudi Arabia— home to the two holiest sites of Islam.  In several fatwas (religious rulings) issued by bin Laden and his associates in the past decade, Muslims were instructed to kill Americans, including civilians, anywhere in the world where they can be found.  Muslims are, then, duty-bound to prepare as much force as possible to attack the “enemies of God.”


            It is not surprising, therefore, that as early as 1992, al-Qaida declared that the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Horn of Africa should be attacked.  Major al-Qaida operations against the United States include: the October 3-4, 1993, killing of 18 servicemen on an anti-terrorism mission in Somalia; the November 13, 1995, car bomb explosion outside the American-operated Saudi National Guard training center in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing 5 Americans and 2 Indians; the June 25, 1996, car bombing attack at Khobar Towers, a U.S. Air Force Housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 soldiers and wounding hundreds more; the August 7, 1998, 2 truck bombings outside the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 234, 12 of them American, and wounding over 5,000 others; and the October 12, 2000, suicide bombing of the USS Cole, killing 17 and wounding 39 American sailors in Aden harbor, Yemen. 


Other attacks by bin Laden’s network have reached the United States itself.  On February 23, 1993, a bomb was detonated in a garage at the World Trade Center in New York, killing 6 people and injuring over 1,000.  On June 25, 1993, a Pakistani terrorist opened fire outside the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Virginia, killing 2 and wounding 3 CIA employees.


            To carry out these operations, particularly the most daring and devastating September 11, 2001, attack, al-Qaida established an effective organizational structure comprised of several key command and control components: the majlis al shura (consultation council) that considers and approves major policy and actions, including the issuance of fatwas and general terrorist strategies; the military committee that focuses on specific operations against its enemies; the business committee that overseas economic and financial matters; the religious committee that deals with theological matters; the media committee that works on printing information; and a travel office.


            This organizational structure was developed to facilitate the activities of al-Qaida and its affiliate groups around the world.  It is increasingly becoming evident that in the United States there exists an elaborate network of different militant Islamic-oriented cells linked with several well-known movements such as Hizballah (Lebanon), Hamas (Palestinian Authority), Islamic Jihad (Egypt), and the Armed Islamic Group (Algeria).  These and other terrorist groups have representatives and “sleeper agents” also in neighboring Canada and in every region of the world.


            The co-founders of al-Qaida in the early 1990s were the “Emir” bin Laden and (Saudi Arabian), Ayman al-Zawahiri (Egyptian), and Muhammed Atef (Egyptian).  A special effort was made by the



movement to recruit American members, such as Ali Abdelsoud Mohamed.  Born in Egypt and becoming a naturalized American citizen, Mohamed pleaded guilty on October 20, 2000, to 5 counts of conspiracy to attack American targets.  Currently, he is cooperating with U.S. authorities.


            Already on high alert as a result of the September 11 attacks, the anthrax scare incidents, and the warnings of further terrorist assaults on the United States, American security officials from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have joined agencies of other nations, such as Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, in probing the possibilities of al-Qaida possessing weapons of mass destruction.  It is noteworthy that as early as May 1998, bin Laden issued a statement

entitled “The Nuclear Bomb of Islam,” in which he proclaimed that it is the duty of Muslims to employ even unconventional capabilities, including the use of nuclear weapons.


            U.S. coalition intelligence operatives in Afghanistan discovered credible evidence related to al-Qaida’s intensive efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction.  For instance, authorities found documents in al-Qaida’s safe houses in Kabul related to the methodologies in the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.  The discovery of laboratory equipment, bio-terrorism manuals, and chemical and biological training facilities elsewhere in Afghanistan are additional ominous illustrations of the intentions of bin Laden’s network to resort to super-terrorism.


            A warning for such an eventuality was issued by the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century.  In a report released on March 15, 2001, the commission asserted, “Global trends in scientific, technological, economic, socio-political and military-security domains… will produce fundamental qualitative changes in the U.S. national security environment.”  Furthermore, the report concludes, “The United States will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on the American homeland, and U.S. military superiority will not entirely protect us.”


V.        The al-Qaida Network in European Countries Participating in the Visa Waiver Program


            In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 tragic attacks, President George W. Bush issued a Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2 “Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies” in which he detailed American National Policy as follows:


            “The United States has a long and valued tradition of welcoming immigrants and visitors. But the attacks of September 11, 2001, showed that some come to the United States to commit terrorist acts, to raise funds for illegal terrorist activities, or to provide other support for terrorist operations, here and abroad. It is the policy of the United States to work aggressively to prevent aliens who engage in or support terrorist activity from entering the United States and to detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens who are within the Untied States.”


            What is of particular concern is the fact that the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), which enables citizens of participating European countries to travel to the United States for tourism and business for ninety days or less without obtaining a U.S. visa opens up a new vulnerability to American security interests.  Since the al-Qaida network is operating to a larger or smaller extent in most of the participating countries, some citizens who serve as operatives for the transnational terrorist group can easily enter the United States for potential attacks in this country. The following survey of the al-Qaida network in Europe briefly describes some activities of the movement and portrays the involvement of selected citizens of a number of the nations participating in the VWP.





During the 2001 Embassy Bombing Trials in New York City, one of the defendants, Wadih el Hage, had in his possession cards from Austrian banks. Hage, an American citizen, was able to conduct business throughout Europe without hindrance.  As part of the financial war on terrorism, Austria has been active in the freezing of terrorist assets.



Tarek Maaroufi: Belgian national born in Tunisia who was arrested in December 2001 for violating a 1979 law forbidding Belgians from recruiting for a foreign army. American intelligence, along with Italian authorities, believe that Maaroufi was involved in planning an armed attack on the U.S. Embassy in Rome in January 2001 with a number of Milan-based Tunisians, led by Essid Sami Ben Khemais, currently on trial in Milan.



Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri: Al-Zawahiri is believed to have lived in Denmark and Switzerland in the early 1990s, where he is believed to have utilized several fake identities, including Dr. Abdel Muaz, used to travel to America to raise money.  An official stated “Dr. Zawahri's freewheeling role across western Europe during the early 1990s raises questions about the security and asylum policies of a number of European nations and about their refusal to act on information provided by the Egyptian Government."[1]



Abdel Salem Boulanouar:  French-Algerian with ties to Ahmed Ressam, Fateh Kamel, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.  Arrested June 24, 2000, in Paris after being deported by the Philippines.[2]


Djamel Beghal:  A 35 year-old French-Algerian who was arrested in September 2001 in the United Arab Emirates and extradited to France. Beghal confessed to French investigators that, along with Kamel Daoudi, he was plotting to attack the American Embassy in Paris.[3] 


Jerome Courtailler:  A French national, Jerome Courtailler, a former drug addict, moved to London, converted to Islam, and joined the mosque of radical cleric Omar Mahmoud Othman Omar.  Jerome eventually went to Afghanistan to train in the terrorist camps and later moved to Rotterdam to establish a Dutch cell of al-Qaida.  Courtailler was involved in the plan to blow up the American Embassy in Paris.  Arrested in a raid by the Dutch police on September 13, 2001, he is currently being held by the Dutch authorities.


Kamel Daoudi:  A 27 year-old French-Algerian who was arrested in Great Britain in September 2001 and extradited to France in connection with the planned suicide attack on the American Embassy in Paris.[4] 






Zacarias Moussaoui: A 34 year-old French national of Moroccan descent, Moussaoui converted to a strict form of Islam in the early 1990s while living in Great Britain.  He was reported to be the “20th hijacker” on United Airlines Flight 93. He was indicted in federal court in Virginia on December 11,

2001, on multiple charges, including conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries, conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy, conspiracy to destroy aircraft, conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, conspiracy to murder US government employees, and conspiracy to destroy US government property. He could face the death penalty if convicted on four of these charges.



Said Bahaji: A German of Moroccan origin, he was the roommate of the ringleader of the September 11 attacks, Egyptian Mohamed Atta, and the original “20th hijacker” Yemeni Ramzi Binalshibh, who was

unable to enter into the United States.  German authorities accuse Bahaji along with Binalshibh of forming a terrorist organization and for causing 3,000 deaths.[5] A warrant was issued for his arrest in September 2001.



Abrahim Bazir: A Libyan-born Irish citizen, Bazir was arrested on October 10, 2001, along with Algerian Zaid Haich, and Libyans Mohammed Al Masrati and Abdul Quadir, by Dublin police on accusations of fundraising and providing false identification to al-Qaida network.  The police also seized documents, including false passports and phone numbers, and £11,000 in Irish punts.



Imad Eddin Barakat Yarbas:  A Spanish citizen of Syrian origin, Yarbas, a used car dealer and the leader of al-Qaida, was arrested in November 2001, in Madrid.[6]  Yarbas, along with seven others, was accused of recruiting people to al-Qaida terrorist training camps and providing false identification for the recruits.[7] 


Yusuf Galan:  One of the Spanish national suspects detained by the authorities was Yusuf Galan, who under his former name of Luis Jose Galan Gonzalez was active in Herri Batasuna, the political wing of the Basque terrorist group ETA.[8]  This could possibly constitute a tie between al-Qaida and non-Islamic terrorist organizations.



Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri: Al-Zawahiri, the second in command in the al-Qaida network, is believed to have lived in Denmark and Switzerland in the early 1990s. Swiss bank accounts are suspected to hold assets of al-Qaida and its affiliates.  Egyptian security officials state that al-Zawahiri supposedly carries a Swiss passport under the name of Amin Othman,[9] although Switzerland denies he was ever issued a Swiss passport.[10]





Richard Colvin Reid:  A British national of mixed European and Jamaican descent, Reid, 28, attempted to light a fuse to his explosive-laden sneakers on American Airlines flight 63 from Paris to Miami on


December 22, 2001.  On January 16, 2002, Reid was charged with nine counts, including two counts of interfering with a flight crew, attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, attempted homicide, placing explosive devices on an aircraft, attempted murder, attempted destruction of an aircraft, using a destructive device during and in relation to a crime of violence, and attempted wrecking of a mass transportation vehicle.[11] Reid can face up to five life sentences if convicted. 


Ahmed Omar Saeed Shiekh: A British citizen of Pakistani origin, Omar attended the London School of Economics, dropping out in 1992 to become an aid worker in Bosnia. Omar was radicalized by his stay

in Bosnia and moved to Pakistan, joining the Kashmiri terrorist group Harakat ul-Muhajideen (HUM).   He was captured by Indian forces in 1994 for kidnapping four Western tourists but was released after the hijacking of an Indian Airlines jet in December 1999. Omar then joined the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and was involved in the kidnapping and murder of Wall Street Journal journalist Daniel Pearl in February 2002.  Omar was secretly indicted by the United States in November 2001 and is currently in Pakistani custody. 


VI.       Conclusion: Implications for the Visa Waiver Policy


The September 11 “Day of Infamy” attacks have most dramatically demonstrated that the United States has failed to appreciate the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threat.  It is now becoming increasingly clear that terrorism employed by aliens in the United States, with the direct or indirect involvement of naturalized American citizens, is no longer a minor nuisance or irritant but is, rather, a major challenge to American security interests.


The policy implications are six-fold:


First, there are no simplistic or complete solutions to the dangers of diaspora terrorism.  Since the tactics utilized to challenge the authority of the United States continue to be novel, so, too, must be the response by the government. We must also be cautious to avoid the kinds of overreaction that could lead to repression and the ultimate weakening of the democratic institutions that we seek to protect.


Second, the vulnerability of modern society and its infrastructure, coupled with the opportunities for the utilization of sophisticated high-leverage conventional and unconventional weaponry, requires the United Sates to both unilaterally, and in concert, develop credible responses and capabilities to minimize future threats.


Third, security measures must be taken to make certain that institutions with seemingly legitimate and often humanitarian ties to a foreign cause are, in fact, legitimate and are not controlled by, or illegally influenced by, international terrorist organizations. Particular attention should be paid to



educational and religious institutions, foundations, banks, and corporations with links to terrorist groups at home and abroad.


Fourth, immigration procedures, such as establishing verification practices to make certain that individuals who receive visas for particular purposes, (e.g., educational pursuits), in fact, allow investigators to identify and detain, if necessary, foreign nationals in the United States who are not conforming to the terms of the visa.



Fifth, the use of national identification cards for U.S. citizens and for aliens who are in the United States should be considered in order to minimize the risk of terrorists using fraudulent passports, visas, and credit cards.


And sixth, in waging a war against diaspora terrorism, law enforcement agencies must reconcile the needs of national security with the requirements of civil liberties. Those agencies should never treat the foreign nationals of a particular country that may be sponsoring or supporting terrorism in the United States as guilty until proven innocent.

[1] “Bin Laden’s Right Hand Man,” BBC News, September 24, 2001.

[2] Donald G. McNeil Jr., “French Hold Suspected Terrorist Tied to bin Laden,” New York Times, June 28, 2000, p. A4.

[3] “Bin Laden ‘Named’ in Paris Plot,” BBC News, October 2, 2001.

[4]  Ibid.

[5] “Germany Names Yemeni Suspect,” CNN, September 21, 2001.

[6] Peter Finn and Pamela Rolfe, “Spain Holds 8 Linked to Sept. 11 Plot,” The Washington Post, November 19, 2001.

[7] “Spanish Police Hold Bin Laden Suspects,” BBC News, November 13, 2001.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Richard Engel, “Inside Al-Qaeda: A Window into the World of Militant Islam and the Afghani Alumni,”, September 28, 2001.

[11] Fran Fifis, “Suspect in Shoe Bombing Case Indicted,” CNN, January 17, 2002.