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Before the Regarding Effective Immigration Controls to Deter Terrorism Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee: My name is Jeanne A. Butterfield and I am the Executive Director of the American
Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA). I appear today as an observer and participant
in the development of U.S. immigration policy for nearly twenty years, eight
of those years with AILA. AILA is the national bar association of nearly 8,000
attorneys and law professors who represent the entire spectrum of applicants
for immigration adjudications. I appreciate this opportunity to present our views on current U.S. immigration
policy and I hope to provide some useful perspectives on how we can develop
immigration controls that are effective in deterring terrorism and enhancing
our nation's security. We need to undertake this task on several fronts, with
immigration reform being one important aspect of the effort. As we develop reforms
in this area, we need to make sure that they are effective. We cannot allow
false solutions to real problems to lull us into a degree of security we have
not achieved. We need to undertake reforms to our immigration system with this important
understanding: that we are a nation of immigrants, that immigration remains
central to who we are as a country and helps explain our success as a people
and a nation. Furthermore, we must take on this task with the clear understanding
that it is precisely in times of danger that we must fiercely defend our Constitution
and the protections and liberties that distinguish us from other nations. We must recognize that existing laws and procedures offer us significant protections
and pose certain problems. I thus will begin with an overview of current measures
and powers that the Immigration and Naturalization Service and Department of
State already have that can be used more effectively, if properly coordinated
with good intelligence information, to deter terrorism. I will conclude with
some proposals about new measures that Congress could mandate that would add
to our deterrence capabilities. CURRENT POWERS AND PROCEDURES 1. Grounds of inadmissibility Current immigration law provides the government with extraordinary powers to
deny admission to any person we believe might be intending to come to the United
States to violate our laws and endanger our safety. Consular officers in posts around the world have virtually unreviewable discretion
to deny a visa to any person for any number of reasons listed in our statutes.
Further, as a second layer of deterrence and protection, anyone who is issued
a visa abroad is subject a second time to these same grounds of inadmissibility
when they present themselves to an INS inspector for inspection and entry at
any U.S. port of entry (airport or land border). A person can be denied admission
on either of these two occasions-denied a visa in the first instance, or denied
entry in the second. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides several broad national security-related
grounds upon which any person can be denied a visa to enter the United States: b) a person who has engaged in terrorist activity is inadmissible (INA Section
212(a)(3)(B)(i)(I)); terrorist activity is broadly defined and includes, among
the more commonly identified activities such as hijackings, the following range
of activities (INA Section 212(a)(3)(B)(ii) and (iii)) : c) a person who a consular officer or INS has "reasonable ground to believe"
is likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activity is inadmissible (INA
Section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(II)); d) a person whose entry or activities in the U.S. the Secretary of State has
reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign
policy consequences for the United States is inadmissible (INA Section 212(a)(C)). These extensive grounds of inadmissibility make it clear that the United States
has extensive power and grounds to deny a visa or entry to anyone it has reason
to believe may endanger the national security. The question properly before
the INS, Department of State and U.S. Congress is how the various agencies that
implement and enforce these laws can be provided with the necessary and timely
intelligence information they need to properly apply these grounds of inadmissibility
and prevent those who intend to commit terrorist acts from entering the country. Unfortunately, our immigration admissions and visa issuance systems and laws
are only as good as the information available to those enforcing them. We have
yet to devise a system that will allow a U.S. consular officer or an INS inspector
to gaze into a person's heart or mind and divine their intentions. Stricter
scrutiny may deter the casual criminal, but it is unlikely to deter those who
have no known criminal record, no evidence of association with an terrorist
activity or organization, yet whose heart is intent on committing a heinous
crime some months or years hence. 2. Grounds of deportability Once in the United States, any temporary non-immigrant (visitors, students,
temporary workers) or lawful permanent resident can be detained and deported
if they engage in terrorist activity. Again, the grounds for deportability are broad, and give the government the
power to deport anyone who has engaged in terrorist activities, including all
of the activities enumerated above: planning, fundraising, soliciting for membership,
providing material support for an organization's terrorist activity (INA Section
237((a)(4)(B). A person is also deportable if he has engaged in "any other criminal activity
which endangers public safety or national security (INA Section 237(a)(4)(A)(ii)).
This ground of deportability does not require any criminal conviction. If the government only later learns that a person was involved overseas in
a foreign terrorist organization, or had otherwise engaged in a terrorist activity,
that person too is later deportable, on the grounds that he was "inadmissible
at time of entry". Finally, an immigration judge has the power to deny asylum or other relief
from deportation to a person who is otherwise eligible for that relief, if the
person represents a threat to national security. Specifically, the statute includes
mandatory bars to asylum relief for: (a) anyone who "there are reasonable grounds for regarding...as a danger
to the security of the United States (INA Section 208(b)(2)(A)(iv)); or In short, the government currently has broad and sufficient powers to deport
anyone who presents a danger to the United States on terrorism grounds. Of course,
deportation is no deterrence for those who fully intend to end their lives while
committing a terrorist act. 3. Detention Powers The INS currently has very broad powers to detain someone pending and continuing
through their deportation hearing and any subsequent appeal. Under current law,
immigrants charged with deportability for terrorist activity or certain violent
crimes have been found ineligible to even apply for release from custody (INA
Section 236(c). For those immigrants who have the right to seek release on bond
before an immigration judge, that request can be, and is often, denied if the
person is deemed to be a threat to national security, a danger to the community
or otherwise present a risk of flight. The current regulations, recently amended and republished as an interim final
regulation in the Federal Register by Attorney General Ashcroft (8 CFR Part
287, amending Section 287.3(d), provide further that a person may be detained
without a warrant of arrest under the authority contained in Section 287(a)(2)
of the INA. Under the regulation, as currently in force, a determination about
whether actual immigration violation charges will be brought against a person
will be made within 48 hours of the arrest, except in the event of an emergency
or other extraordinary circumstance in which case a determination will be made
within an additional reasonable period of time, whether the alien will be continued
in custody or released on bond or recognizance and whether a notice to appear
and warrant of arrest as prescribed in 8 CFR parts 236 and 239 will be issued."
(emphasis added) It is these already extraordinary powers of detention that have allowed the
Attorney General to detain some reported 165 persons on suspected technical
immigration violations in recent weeks, with no determination being made to
date for many about whether they will in fact be charged or not. The question
must be posed here: what is "an additional reasonable period of time"
under the regulations? Is two weeks reasonable in current circumstances? Is
five weeks unreasonable? Those being detained, the press, the advocacy community
and the Congress surely deserve an answer to this question. In new powers contemplated in the pending "USA" Act (S. 1510), the
Attorney General will be given the power to implement mandatory detention of
anyone he "certifies" that he has reasonable grounds to believe fall
within the definition of "terrorist" or "terrorist activity"
as outlined above. This new power will prevent a person so "certified"
from seeking release on bond, whether or not the person is charged with deportability
based on terrorist grounds or is simply charged with a technical visa violation. These broad new powers, when enacted, must be used carefully and not be used
to detain individuals indefinitely without proving that their detention is necessary
to protect national security or the public. Congress in 1996 created the new Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures (INA Section
501 through 507). These procedures were designed to allow the government to
conduct deportation hearings with the use of secret evidence. While the new
court was to be composed of 5 district court justices appointed by the Chief
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, a single justice is empowered to consider
classified information presented ex parte and in camera. In recognition of the extraordinary nature of such proceedings, certain protections
were provided, including the right to be informed of the nature of the charges
and a "general account" of the basis for the charges (the secret evidence),
and the right to be represented by assigned counsel at government expense. (INA
Section 504(b) and (c). To date, this new Alien Terrorist Removal Court has not been convened. The
government has, however, used "secret evidence" in regular deportation
hearings, primarily in the context of bond determinations and in opposing applications
for discretionary relief, such as political asylum or adjustment of status.
(See, for more details about past secret evidence cases, Akram, Susan, Scheherezade
Meets Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological Exclusion, Georgetown Immigration
Law Journal, Fall, 1999; 14 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 51) The use of secret evidence is anathema to a democracy. Its use, in the rare
instances where the government strongly believes it is necessary to protect
the life of confidential sources, should be confined to proceedings in the "Alien
Terrorist Removal Court". The law governing these special proceedings,
in recognition of their extraordinary nature, at least mandates certain protections,
such as appointed counsel, for the accused. 5. Expedited removal The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA)
also provides the government with extraordinary new powers at U.S. ports of
entry to deny admission and summarily remove any person who the INS inspector
believes is presenting fraudulent documents, including a facially valid visa
if there is some reason to believe that the visa was obtained through fraud
or misrepresentation, or if the person is believed to be attempting to enter
the U.S. for a purpose inconsistent with the terms of the visa. The new expedited removal provisions have been scrutinized extensively because
they run the danger of sweeping into their orbit legitimate asylum seekers who
are most likely to be fleeing their persecutors without having first obtained
proper travel documents. We must be careful not to create a process that a terrorist
with adequate funding, education and documents can penetrate, but which turns
away legitimate asylum seekers who have no documents and who are too scared
or traumatized by abuse to adequately make their claim at the border. However, the expedited removal powers contained in our immigration statutes
give INS inspectors sweeping and unreviewable power to deny entry to suspected
terrorists and return them on the next flight out. A person so excluded cannot
obtain a visa to enter the U.S. for at least five years. Clearly such powers must be used carefully and with adequate protections. The
hapless visitor with entirely legitimate business purposes who is returned on
the next plane to Singapore and denied a visa for the next five years has little
recourse. There must be a means to challenge such mistakes, and to obtain a
waiver of the five-year ban. In previous times, such a person could request
a hearing before an immigration judge and present evidence to prove that their
intent was legitimate. No more, under the terms of the 1996 laws. However sweeping and subject to abuse, these powers do provide another existing
means to deter terrorists. But, as outlined above, these powers to deny admission
and summarily exclude are only as effective as the intelligence information
provided to the INS inspector at the port of entry. What we do not want to see
as a result is thousands of legitimate visitors and even refugees being summarily
excluded, while international criminals and terrorists, who have the means to
purchase or otherwise obtain valid documents, slip through undetected. That
unfortunately may be the result of these expanded powers. 6. Reporting requirements: The operation of current reporting requirements for foreign students and the
arrival and departure of passengers both are areas needing significant improvements.
a. Student Reporting More than 500,000 foreign students last year were enrolled in colleges and
universities around the country. These students are a vital part of our higher
education system. In California, the state with the greatest number of international
students, just over 66,000 students from 1999-2000 brought $1.6 billion dollars
into the state's economy. Foreign students have made enormous contributions
in the advancement of technology and science, and graduates from American colleges
and universities have gone on to lead nations and shape history. We have long understood that the opportunity to study in this country comes
with rules and responsibilities that affect both the students and the institutions.
All foreign students must apply for a visa and must be able to prove that they
are not inadmissible to the United States. Since at least 1985, colleges and
universities approved to receive foreign students are required to gather and
report information about foreign students to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. This information includes the student's current address, date of commencement
of studies, the student's written application for admission and other supporting
documents the school uses to determine eligibility, the date and reason for
termination of a student, and any academic disciplinary actions taken against
the student due to any criminal convictions. In the aftermath of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the INS created
the Coordinated Interagency Partnership for Regulating International Students
(CIPRIS) as a pilot program to provide for the electronic transfer of student
information between institutions and the INS. In 1996, IIRAIRA mandated that
INS fully implement the CIPRIS system by 2001. After 1996, the INS found that
it could not address all the technical problems and asked Congress for an extension
of 2001 deadline. Although the program to provide for the electronic transfer of the information
collected on foreign students has yet to be implemented, colleges and universities
are still required to collect and report the data to INS, and an INS officer
can request access to it at any time. At intervals specified by the INS, but not more frequently than once a term
or session, the Service's processing center is required to send each school
a list of all foreign students who, according to Service records, are attending
that school. A designated school official at the school must note on the list
whether or not each student on the list is pursuing a full course of study and
give the names and current addresses of all student visa holders not listed,
attending the school and other information specified by the Service as necessary
to identify the students and to determine their immigration status. The designated school official must comply with the request, sign the list,
state his or her title, and return the list to the Service's processing center
within sixty days of the date of the request. Failure to follow any of the procedures
and regulations will result in the withdrawal of the schools approval to receive
non-immigrant students. The INS is working with colleges and universities to develop this system electronically.
The electronic system is only beginning to be implemented as an operational
prototype with 21 educational institutions. The failure, if any, of the student
tracking system is not the absence of laws, but the lack of resources. Congress
needs to provide funding to get this system up and running and maintained in
those schools authorized to enroll foreign students. As the prototype is expanded, the INS needs to assess and report to Congress
on the feasibility of this system, and whether it can improve the security of
the U.S. relative to implementation costs, and do so in a way that does not
intrude excessively on the privacy rights and civil liberties of students. b. Verifying Departures Requiring airlines and other passenger carriers to identify passengers' arrivals
and departures has been a part of our laws for many years. Passenger carriers
are required by law to deliver to the immigration officers at the port of arrival
and departure a list or manifest of the persons on board such vessel or aircraft.
According to the law, "such lists or manifests shall be prepared at such
time, be in such form and shall contain such information as the Attorney General
shall prescribe by regulation as being necessary for the identification of the
persons transported and for the enforcement of the immigration laws." This language grants broad power to the Attorney General to decide when and
how an airline identifies its passengers. The problems we now have with identifying
who is coming and going from our shores are technological, not legal. In 1997,
the Office of the Inspector General found that the principal INS record-keeping
system for tracking nonimmigrant overstays, the Nonimmigrant Information System
(NIIS), does not produce reliable data. Normally, passengers arriving in the United States fill out an I-94 form and
present it to the INS inspector upon arrival. The inspector collects the arrival
portion of the form and returns the departure portion to the passenger. The
arrival portion is sent to an INS contractor, who inputs the data into NIIS.
When the person leaves the United States, the airlines are supposed to collect
the departure portion of the I-94 form and provide it to the INS for input into
NIIS. The data is then matched by NIIS to identify nonimmigrant overstays. The OIG report found that the NIIS data is incomplete and unreliable due to
missing departure records and errors in records processing. NIIS does not contain
departure records for a large number of aliens, most of whom the INS assumes
have left the United States. The INS believes that many of these unrecorded
departures result from airlines failing to collect departure forms, aliens departing
through land borders, data entry errors, records being lost through electronic
transmission or tape-loading problems, and the failure of the system to match
arrival and departure records. The question that Congress must ask, as it considers the possible expansion
of procedures to verify departures, is what use can be made of the extraordinary
amount of data that would be collected under such procedures. The U.S. admits
over 30 million non-immigrant visitors per year. If data regarding departures
shows that just five percent of these visitors fail to depart at the end of
their authorized stay, that information still does not inherently make us safer
as a nation, nor does it deter terrorism. What do we need to further enhance our nation's security? Enhancing this country's
intelligence capacity is key. Any changes that we make to our immigration policy
will work to the degree that they interface with, and take advantage of, enhanced
intelligence information. Any such reforms must meet our due process and civil
liberties concerns and standards. There is much Congress and the Administration can do. Needed reforms include
increased funding for the DOS and INS, increased access to lookout lists, reforms
at our consulates, the use of new technologies, direct government funding of
these technologies, more pre-inspections abroad, mandated in-flight transmittal
of passenger lists, the creation of a North American Perimeter Safety Zone,
and a workable entry-exit control system. These measures will help us to increase
the layers of protection that stand between us and any potential adversaries
from abroad. We need to remember that our best protection derives from keeping targeted
people from entering the U.S. Such measures are more effective and easier to
implement than measures that focus on persons after they enter the United States.
In all cases, we need to make sure that we keep out people who want to do us
harm, not those seeking to come to our country for the reasons that people have
always come here, including reuniting with their families, working or escaping
persecution. The following new measures to increase security and deterrence
should be carefully considered: 1. Increased funding for DOS and INS It is important to increase funding and data access for the Department of State
(DOS) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). At present, both
agencies' computer systems are technologically obsolete, with different offices
often unable to share information with the other, and some offices, especially
those overseas, not even having computer capacity. In order to effectively fight
terrorism by enhancing our intelligence capabilities and improving our border
security, both the DOS and the INS need increased funding to upgrade their technological
infrastructures. Such funding needs to come from direct federal appropriations.
INS and DOS increased technological capacities cannot be supported through user
fees. This enhanced capacity to meet our security needs is a national function
best supported through the federal government. 2. The Use of New Technologies Given the complexities of gathering, sharing and making accessible a great
range of information about individuals and their identities, it is critical
to make use of existing and emerging technologies to achieve the most reliable
means of verifying identity. Traditionally, fingerprinting has served this function.
However, any standard based on fingerprinting has significant limitations that
new technologies can overcome. Lookout systems and other data networks can be
further improved by the use of new technologies that can match a unique identifying
characteristic of an individual with a name. One of these new, unintrusive technologies
is a face recognition system that uses cameras to scan a person's face and compare
the picture with a database containing the photos of persons about whom the
authorities are interested. The database for this technology would contain only
the images of persons the authorities are looking for and is relatively inexpensive.
The federal government needs to fund the development and use of these new technologies
and make sure the various federal agencies coordinate compatible efforts in
this area. 3. Access to Lookout Lists U.S. federal agencies, as well as international law enforcement officials,
need direct access to the various lookout lists maintained by different agencies.
These lookout lists include the names of people who should not be admitted to
the U.S. or should be pulled aside for questioning should the authorities come
into contact with them. Increased funding would allow the agencies to build
up their technological capacities so that, for example, DOS and INS. would be
able to directly access the FBI and other agencies' databases to review information
that would help them determine whether someone should be allowed to enter the
U.S. or be granted a positive response to an application or petition. Such direct
access would enable law enforcement agencies to act immediately to identify
those high-risk individuals who seek to enter the U.S. or receive other immigration
benefits. These lists need to be integrated and accessible, with the information
updated in a timely manner. We also must include safeguards against potential abuse of this data that would
limit the re-dissemination of such information, ensure the security and confidentiality
of such information, protect privacy rights of individuals who are subject to
such information, and establish procedures that determine who stays on and is
removed from these lists. Such safeguards will become even more necessary as
the lists increase in size and unfamiliar names from various regions of the
world may be incorrectly keyed in. We must make every effort to ensure the accuracy
of the names on the list so that the wrong individual is not targeted. 4. Consulate Reforms Our intelligence gathering can be further improved by changing some of the
operations of our consulates. As noted above, consulate staff cannot do their
job if they have neither the necessary intelligence information nor the technological
capacity to access, upload, and download this intelligence information in a
timely manner. In addition, we need to upgrade the status of the consulate officer
who interviews an applicant to assess whether the applicant is allowed to enter
the U.S. Currently, this function tends to be performed by more junior personnel
with less experience. In the future, each post should be required to have a
core of civil service specialists who would remain at certain posts or be rotated
between posts to increase the level of experience of the person who is making
the important decision about who is given a visa to come to the U.S. Furthermore, this decision needs to be reviewable. In these times of heightened
scrutiny such review is vital to ensure the integrity of the system. We should
welcome such a review as part of the checks and balances that are central to
our democracy and vital to our system of protections. We recommend providing
any applicant for entry or a visa, in writing, the reason for the denial of
entry and an avenue for review of any denial based on this information. In those
cases where the adverse decision is affirmed, the applicant should be provided
with a means of appeal to the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia 5. Pre-Inspection U.S. pre-inspection programs are in effect in only 5 countries in the world-Canada,
Ireland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, and Aruba. In these locations, passengers are
in effect "pre-inspected" for admission to the U.S. before ever boarding
a plane--passports are checked and names are run against the lookout list. This
pre-inspection process allows more time for inspection and increases the likelihood
of a more thorough check. This procedure would move our system from one that focuses on a person's point
of entry into the U.S. to one that focuses on their point of origin. The INS
and DOS together would need to recommend where such pre-inspections should take
place, as it would be impossible to undertake this procedure at every airport
in the world. It also would be important to deal with host countries about any
sovereignty issues that might arise when someone is to be arrested, with U.S.
officials working cooperatively with authorities at the pre-clearance site who
have the power to arrest and detain. Such cooperation should include assurances
that suspected terrorists are not released because the host country authorities
do not view the threat as seriously as does the U.S. Congress needs to carefully examine and weigh the costs of such a pre-inspection
program. As with other programs to increase security and deterrence, the federal
government will need to find ways to fund such initiatives. The cost of setting
up and maintaining an overseas INS inspections staff is not an insignificant
one. Furthermore, any pre-inspections system must provide for mechanisms, including
specially trained personnel, to assure that legitimate asylum seekers are afforded
a meaningful opportunity to seek protection. The balancing of increased security
needs and strengthened deterrence measures against terrorists with the obligation
under U.S. and international law to protect those fleeing persecution must be
maintained in a way that does not exclude asylum seekers from protection. Stringent
pre-inspection at foreign airports much be accompanied by expanded asylum determination
or "credible fear" screening, so that asylum seekers can continue
to the U.S. to pursue their compelling and legitimate claims. 6. In-Flight Transmittal of Passenger Lists Mandating at the time of take off that all airlines transmit passengers' names
to the destination airport to be checked against the look out list is another
important security tool. Through their reservation systems, airlines know in
advance who will be flying to the U.S. Transmitting the list in advance would
give U.S. authorities the opportunity to compare the passenger list to the lookout
lists, thereby preventing from entering or apprehending those who should not
be permitted to enter the U.S. Currently, about 75% of airlines transmit these
lists. The effectiveness of such a system also depends on the INS having adequate
technology and personnel on the receiving end to make swift and efficient use
of the incoming information. 7. North American Perimeter Safety Zone To further enhance our intelligence, the U.S. needs to employ multilateral
strategies with Canada and Mexico to enhance the security of all three countries
to create a North American perimeter. Such a North American perimeter will bolster security through law enforcement
coordination, intelligence sharing, and better joint use of enforcement resources.
Such coordination and cooperation would reduce the chance that someone wishing
to do harm to the U.S. would travel to one of our neighboring countries and
then cross by land into the U.S. Beyond our immediate neighbors, the U.S. needs to more closely cooperate with
our European allies in particular and share information that each of our intelligence
services have collected. Consistent with the need to protect the privacy of
innocent persons, we should have access to their version of the lookout lists,
and reciprocate by sharing our information. Any cooperation among governments in the region in immigration enforcement
should include a plan to ensure that asylum seekers have meaningful access to
protection. While Mexico has recently acceded to the refugee convention, access
to asylum remains problematic, particularly for migrants intercepted at Mexico's
southern border. Access to asylum procedures in Central American countries is
even less assured. On the other hand, Canada should not be pressured into diminishing protections
for refugees. All countries in the region can and should strengthen security
measures. However, none should be required to lower their protections for refugees
to the "lowest common denominator." As North American security cooperation also addresses the issues of smuggling
and trafficking, the European experience is particularly relevant regarding
protection for asylum seekers. UNHCR commissioned a report that concluded that
the majority of asylum seekers arriving in the European Union have been smuggled
or trafficked. The report also states that in the European Union "the effects
of blanket enforcement measures, such as common visa policies, readmission treaties,
carrier sanctions, and airline liaison officers (pre-inspection personnel) act
to deny refugees the possibility of illegal exit from the regions of their persecution."
The report recommends that European nations review their migration and asylum
policies to open other channels to people fleeing persecution in their native
countries. This includes incorporating the right to seek asylum and the responsibility
of non-refoulment into anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling policy, recognizing
that trafficking and smuggling are both "inherently abusive" and that
both trafficked and smuggled persons can be refugees, improving reception conditions,
and increasing family reunification. 8. Entry-Exit Controls Congress needs to ensure adequate personnel and technological improvements
at and between our ports of entry. The August 2001 GAO Report, "INS Southwest
Border Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues Remain After Seven Years,"
clearly identifies that our security risks apply to both our borders. To that end, it would be helpful to enhance our data gathering at airports
by mandating an entry/exit system that would collect and correlate data about
arrivals and departures. Certain airlines currently collect such information
on a voluntary basis. This important security function should be government-mandated
and funded. The data collected will only be useful if correlated with better
intelligence data. An entry-exit system has been discussed for land border points of entry into
the U.S. Such a system would be difficult to implement, would be exceedingly
disruptive to commerce, and most importantly, would contribute little to the
security of the U.S. A June 1998 report from the Senate Judiciary Committee,
then chaired by Senator Orin Hatch (R-UT), noted the catastrophic delays that
would accompany the implementation of a Section 110 entry-exit system at land
borders. For example, the report cited testimony from an earlier hearing of
a witness who estimated that "assuming the most efficient and remarkable
entry and exit procedures in the world that will take only 30 seconds per vehicle,
and making the equally optimistic assumption that only half the vehicles have
to go through the procedures, that would amount to an extra 3,750 minutes of
additional processing time each day" at the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit.
The witness then pointed out that there are only 1,440 minutes to a day, which
means that implementing a Section 110 entry-exit system at that land border
port of entry would lead to a delay of more than 2 1/2 days. Importantly, the report also notes that it is highly questionable if implementing
Section 110 would ultimately provide any assistance in prosecuting individual
visa overstayers, and has nothing to do with stopping terrorists or traffickers.
An automated entry-exit control system's database will in no way provide information
as to which individuals might be engaging in terrorism or other unlawful activities.
We must not fool ourselves into believing that implementing an entry-exit control
system at land borders will increase our security: It is a false solution that
will hurt our commerce and trade and not contribute to our safety. Again, as in most forms of data collection and record keeping, the usefulness
of the data is very dependent on the quality of the intelligence information
with which it is correlated. Did the vast majority of these people who failed
to depart on time do so for innocent reasons? Did they stay an extra week at
Disney World? Did they delay departure to attend a friend's wedding, or because
Grandma could not fly on account of an ear infection? Did they eventually depart,
one week or two weeks or even a month late? Or are they the tiny, even miniscule
minority who intend to stay to commit some heinous act of terrorism in the United
States? AFFIRMATION OF THIS NATION'S DIVERSITY In the current environment, it is especially important to reaffirm that this
nation's strength and future reside in our unity as a nation, the diversity
from which we draw our strength, and the democratic principles on which our
country is based. President Bush, the Congress, and individual members of Congress,
and many members of the general public all have condemned the violence directed
against Arab-Americans, Muslim-Americans, and Asian-American communities by
misguided people who wrongly blame these communities for the terrorists' heinous
acts. We must continue to support diversity and condemn violence and hate crimes. CONCLUSION In conclusion, let us remember that U.S. immigration policy is based on a number
of values that relate to the core social and economic principles on which our
nation was founded. These values are complementary and interweave to create
the rich fabric that is beneficial to all Americans. Among the most important
values are: " The unification of American families; As the current situation calls out for change in the direction of more effective
means of deterring terrorism, we must not lose sight of these fundamental values
of this nation of immigrants. As we seek to create new means to isolate terrorists,
we must take care not to isolate America in the process. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for this opportunity to share my thoughts
and perspectives with the committee. I and other members of AILA remain available
to discuss these matters with you at any future time. We look forward to working
closely with you on legislative efforts to enact these policy proposals. Share this page | Bookmark this page The leading immigration law publisher - over 50000 pages of free information!
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