ILW.COM - the immigration portal Immigration Daily

Immigration Daily: the news source for legal professionals. Free! Join 35000+ readers

Home Page

Advanced search


Immigration Daily

Archives

Processing times

Immigration forms

Discussion board

Resources

Blogs

Twitter feed

Immigrant Nation

Attorney2Attorney

CLE Workshops

Immigration books

Advertise on ILW

VIP Network

EB-5

Chinese Immig. Daily

About ILW.COM

Connect to us

Make us Homepage

Questions/Comments


SUBSCRIBE

Immigration Daily

 

Chinese Immig. Daily



The leading
immigration law
publisher - over
50000 pages of free
information!

Copyright
©1995-
ILW.COM,
American
Immigration LLC.

Immigration Daily: the news source for
legal professionals. Free! Join 35000+ readers
Enter your email address here:



< Back to current issue of Immigration Daily < Back to current issue of Immigrant's Weekly

< Go back to Immigration Daily

 
Case Name:ALARCON V INS
Case Number:	Date Filed:
99-70578	07/25/00
 

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LUIS ALARCON-SERRANO,
Petitioner,                                           No. 99-70578

v.                                                    INS No.
                                                     A43-036-980
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE,                                              OPINION
Respondent.

Petition to Review a Decision of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service

Submitted May 4, 20001
Pasadena, California

Filed July 25, 2000

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Stephen S. Trott, and
Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Trott

_________________________________________________________________

1 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).


COUNSEL

Joseph M. Bacho, El Centro, California, for the petitioner.

Paul D. Kovac, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S.
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the respondent.

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

TROTT, Circuit Judge:

Luis Alarcon-Serrano ("Alarcon-Serrano") petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") deci-
sion affirming an Immigration Judge's ("IJ") order of exclu-
sion. Alarcon-Serrano claims that the IJ and BIA lacked
sufficient evidence to conclude that it was reasonable to
believe Alarcon-Serrano knowingly participated in drug traf-
ficking. The Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")
argues that this court lacks jurisdiction and, in the alternative,
that the BIA's decision is supported by substantial evidence.
We agree with the INS that we lack jurisdiction pursuant to
section 309(c)(4)(G) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), 110 Stat.
3009, 3625-627.2 Thus, we dismiss Alarcon-Serrano's peti-
tion.

Background

Alarcon-Serrano, a then-nineteen year old resident of Mexi-
cali, Mexico, with lawful permanent resident status in the
_________________________________________________________________
2 Alarcon-Serrano is subject to IIRIRA's transitional rules, as the BIA
dismissed his appeal from the IJ's decision on April 14, 1999, and exclu-
sion proceedings began with the delivery to Alarcon-Serrano on December
1, 1996, of a "Notice to Applicant for Admission Detained for Hearing
Before Immigration Judge." See Kalaw v. INS , 133 F.3d 1147, 1149-50
(9th Cir. 1997).

                               8786


United States, was detained by immigration officers upon
attempting to cross the border at Calexico, California, while
driving a car carrying eighty-six pounds of marijuana con-
cealed in a secret compartment. Exclusion proceedings com-
menced. The INS alleged that he was excludable under two
separate provisions of the INA: section 212(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C.
S 1182(a)(2)(C), as a "Controlled substance trafficker;" and
section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. S 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II),
governing conviction of an offense related to controlled sub-
stances or the admission to committing the essential elements
of a controlled substance offense.3 The facts leading up to
Alarcon-Serrano's attempted crossing at Calexico are as fol-
lows, as testified to by Alarcon-Serrano at his IJ hearing.

Four days prior to his attempted crossing from Mexico to
the United States, Alarcon-Serrano met a man named Isaac
through a friend. Alarcon-Serrano had heard through friends
that Isaac was engaged in smuggling drugs across the border.
On the day of his attempted crossing, Alarcon-Serrano told
Isaac that he was going to Calexico in order to buy some
clothes for his visit to a discotheque in Mexicali later that eve-
ning. Isaac offered Alarcon-Serrano a car to drive on his
shopping trip and, "so that they wouldn't take the vehicle
away in Calexico," also offered to provide a bill of sale for
the vehicle in Alarcon-Serrano's name. Knowing Isaac's rep-
_________________________________________________________________
3 Although the INS attempts to use both of these provisions to support
the IJ and BIA decisions, four reasons dictate that we rely only upon sec-
tion 212(a)(2)(C) in reaching our conclusion in this case: (1) both the IJ
and BIA relied solely on section 212(a)(2)(C) in reaching their decisions;
(2) there is no evidence that Alarcon-Serrano has been convicted of any-
thing, see S 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (making excludable "any alien convicted
of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts
which constitute the essential elements of -- (II) a violation of (or a con-
spiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United
States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance"); (3)
Alarcon-Serrano consistently denied -- that is, did not admit -- having
knowledge of the marijuana's presence, see id. ; and (4) neither the IJ, nor
the BIA, nor the INS point to any particular law or regulation the essential
elements of which Serrano admits to having committed, see id.

                               8787


utation, Alarcon-Serrano testified that he suspected that the
car carried drugs. Nevertheless, Alarcon-Serrano claimed he
trusted that Isaac would not attempt to use him to smuggle
drugs, so he took the car notwithstanding his misgivings.

Although he began his journey to the border at 8 p.m.,
Alarcon-Serrano arrived at the border crossing itself at 9:15
that evening due to the length of the vehicle lines leading up
to the crossing. Alarcon-Serrano testified that he had not told
Isaac "the exact hour" that he would be crossing the border,
but that he observed Isaac crossing the border by foot at the
time he drove into the area. When Alarcon-Serrano saw that
the border officials intended to stop his vehicle, he claims he
honked his horn at Isaac, who looked at him and then looked
away. Border officials stopped the car and found the con-
cealed marijuana.

Alarcon-Serrano appeared pro se at his IJ hearing, having
waived the opportunity to seek a lawyer. At the hearing,
Alarcon-Serrano consistently denied knowledge of the con-
cealed marijuana. The IJ expressed doubt about Alarcon-
Serrano's claimed lack of knowledge, focusing on the fact
that he had received the car and a bill of sale in his name from
a suspected drug-smuggler he had met only four days prior to
his attempted border crossing. The IJ also found that the
amount of the concealed marijuana was "simply too large of
a quantity and too valuable to have been entrusted to a person
unaware of its existence."

Referencing their alleged simultaneous arrival at the border
crossing, the IJ found contradictory Alarcon-Serrano's testi-
mony surrounding the extent of Isaac's knowledge of the
details of Alarcon-Serrano's shopping trip to Calexico. The IJ
also found suspicious Alarcon-Serrano's lack of basic facts
about the friend through whom he had met Isaac. Alarcon-
Serrano testified that he was not sure of his friend's last name,
although he thought it was "Martinez," and could not remem-
ber the name of the street where his friend lives, although the

                               8788


two live only ten blocks apart. While earlier discussing char-
acter letters offered on his behalf by friends, neighbors, and
relatives, Alarcon-Serrano told the IJ that "I don't really know
the last names of my friends."

Finally, the IJ noted that Alarcon-Serrano intended to go
shopping in the United States at Walmart and Foot Locker
late in the evening, but testified that he did not know when the
stores closed. Alarcon-Serrano testified that if Walmart and
Foot Locker were closed, he would simply go to another store
that was open.

The IJ found that "circumstances correlate to show that
[Alarcon-Serrano] colluded with a known drug trafficker to
import in to the United States more than 80 pounds of mari-
juana," and told Alarcon-Serrano that "the evidence is clear,
convincing and unequivocal that you were a knowing traf-
ficker in the smuggling of marijuana." The BIA agreed with
the IJ that Alarcon-Serrano lacked credibility:

      his credibility is undermined by the fact that such a
      large amount of marijuana -- 86 pounds -- was
      found concealed in the car he was driving, by his
      admission that he knew the person who gave him the
      car was a drug dealer, and by his implausible expla-
      nations for how he came into possession of the car
      and why he attempted to enter the United States.

The BIA dismissed Alarcon-Serrano's appeal from the IJ's
order excluding and deporting him from the United States,
effectively affirming the IJ's decision.

Discussion

We determine our own jurisdiction de novo. See Milne v.
Hillblom, 165 F.3d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 1999). The BIA's fac-
tual findings are reviewed for "substantial evidence" and will
not be overturned unless the evidence compels a contrary con-

                               8789


clusion. See Yazitchian v. INS, 207 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir.
2000).

Before we may conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review
Alarcon-Serrano's case, we must determine that his case falls
within the terms of section 309(c)(4)(G). We have jurisdiction
to consider this jurisdictional question. See Ye v. INS, 2000
WL 732911, at *2 (9th Cir. June 9, 2000); Aragon-Ayon v.
INS, 206 F.3d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 2000).

[1] Under IIRIRA section 309(c)(4)(G),"there shall be no
appeal permitted in the case of an alien who is inadmissible
or deportable by reason of having committed a criminal
offense covered in section 212(a)(2) . . . of the[INA] (as in
effect as of the date of the enactment of this Act) . . . ." The
IJ and BIA determined that Serrano was excludable pursuant
to INA section 212(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. S 1182(a)(2)(C)
(amended 1999) (West Supp. 2000). At the time of the IJ
hearing in this case, section 212(a)(2)(C) designated as inad-
missible "[a]ny alien who the consular or immigration officer
knows or has reason to believe is or has been an illicit traf-
ficker in any such controlled substance or is or has been a
knowing assister, abettor, conspirator, or colluder with others
in the illicit trafficking in any such controlled substance."
INA S 212(a)(2)(C). In reviewing the jurisdictional facts, we
may only consider whether, pursuant to IIRIRA section
309(c)(4)(G), Alarcon-Serrano is (i) an alien (ii) who is inad-
missible (iii) by reason of having committed a criminal
offense listed in INA section 212(a)(2). If so, we lack jurisdic-
tion to proceed any further in our review. See Magana-Pizano
v. INS, 200 F.3d 603, 607 (9th Cir. 1999).

Although he has permanent resident status, there is no dis-
pute that Alarcon-Serrano is an alien. The only viable ques-
tion is whether he is inadmissible by reason of a criminal
offense under INA section 212(a)(2)(C). Unlike other provi-
sions of INA section 212(a)(2), the provision applicable to
Alarcon-Serrano does not require a conviction to demonstrate

                               8790


inadmissibility and, for purposes of IIRIRA section
309(c)(4)(G), a lack of federal appellate review. Under sec-
tion 212(a)(2)(C), the only requirement is that an immigration
officer "knows or has reason to believe" that Alarcon-Serrano
is an illicit trafficker in controlled substances or that Alarcon-
Serrano has knowingly assisted, abetted, conspired with, or
colluded with others in such illicit trafficking.

[2] The appropriate way of measuring whether the IJ and
BIA had "reason to believe" that Alarcon-Serrano knew he
was participating in drug trafficking is to determine whether
substantial evidence supports such a conclusion. In this
regard, the conclusion of the immigration judge must be
affirmed if based on reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence. See Hamid v. INS, 538 F.2d 1389, 1390-91 (9th Cir.
1976). Although to some extent this conflates review of the
jurisdictional facts and review of the merits in this case, see
Ye, 2000 WL 732911, at *2, this is the correct path to follow.

[3] Both the BIA and the IJ in this case found that it was
reasonable to believe that Alarcon-Serrano knew he was par-
ticipating in drug trafficking by taking and attempting to drive
across the border a car -- carrying eighty-six pounds of mari-
juana in a concealed compartment -- given to him by a man
he knew to be a drug smuggler whom he had met only four
days earlier. Alarcon-Serrano was therefore determined to be
inadmissible pursuant to INA section 212(a)(2)(C). Alarcon-
Serrano's inadmissibility pursuant to INA section
212(a)(2)(C) is undoubtedly supported by substantial proba-
tive evidence. Both the BIA and the IJ disbelieved Alarcon-
Serrano's testimony claiming lack of knowledge. While a
generous fact-finder might have believed Alarcon-Serrano's
version of the facts, both the BIA and IJ were clearly within
reason on these facts and circumstances to conclude other-
wise.

[4] Because an immigration officer had ample reason to
believe that Alarcon-Serrano knowingly engaged in drug traf-

                               8791


ficking, we lack jurisdiction to consider Alarcon-Serrano's
petition for review pursuant to IIRIRA section 309(c)(4)(G).
Hence, the petition is DISMISSED.

                               8792
 
Case Name:ALARCON V INS
Case Number:	Date Filed:
99-70578	07/25/00
 

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LUIS ALARCON-SERRANO,
Petitioner,                                           No. 99-70578

v.                                                    INS No.
                                                     A43-036-980
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE,                                              OPINION
Respondent.

Petition to Review a Decision of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service

Submitted May 4, 20001
Pasadena, California

Filed July 25, 2000

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Stephen S. Trott, and
Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Trott

_________________________________________________________________

1 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).


COUNSEL

Joseph M. Bacho, El Centro, California, for the petitioner.

Paul D. Kovac, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S.
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the respondent.

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

TROTT, Circuit Judge:

Luis Alarcon-Serrano ("Alarcon-Serrano") petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") deci-
sion affirming an Immigration Judge's ("IJ") order of exclu-
sion. Alarcon-Serrano claims that the IJ and BIA lacked
sufficient evidence to conclude that it was reasonable to
believe Alarcon-Serrano knowingly participated in drug traf-
ficking. The Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")
argues that this court lacks jurisdiction and, in the alternative,
that the BIA's decision is supported by substantial evidence.
We agree with the INS that we lack jurisdiction pursuant to
section 309(c)(4)(G) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), 110 Stat.
3009, 3625-627.2 Thus, we dismiss Alarcon-Serrano's peti-
tion.

Background

Alarcon-Serrano, a then-nineteen year old resident of Mexi-
cali, Mexico, with lawful permanent resident status in the
_________________________________________________________________
2 Alarcon-Serrano is subject to IIRIRA's transitional rules, as the BIA
dismissed his appeal from the IJ's decision on April 14, 1999, and exclu-
sion proceedings began with the delivery to Alarcon-Serrano on December
1, 1996, of a "Notice to Applicant for Admission Detained for Hearing
Before Immigration Judge." See Kalaw v. INS , 133 F.3d 1147, 1149-50
(9th Cir. 1997).

                               8786


United States, was detained by immigration officers upon
attempting to cross the border at Calexico, California, while
driving a car carrying eighty-six pounds of marijuana con-
cealed in a secret compartment. Exclusion proceedings com-
menced. The INS alleged that he was excludable under two
separate provisions of the INA: section 212(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C.
S 1182(a)(2)(C), as a "Controlled substance trafficker;" and
section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. S 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II),
governing conviction of an offense related to controlled sub-
stances or the admission to committing the essential elements
of a controlled substance offense.3 The facts leading up to
Alarcon-Serrano's attempted crossing at Calexico are as fol-
lows, as testified to by Alarcon-Serrano at his IJ hearing.

Four days prior to his attempted crossing from Mexico to
the United States, Alarcon-Serrano met a man named Isaac
through a friend. Alarcon-Serrano had heard through friends
that Isaac was engaged in smuggling drugs across the border.
On the day of his attempted crossing, Alarcon-Serrano told
Isaac that he was going to Calexico in order to buy some
clothes for his visit to a discotheque in Mexicali later that eve-
ning. Isaac offered Alarcon-Serrano a car to drive on his
shopping trip and, "so that they wouldn't take the vehicle
away in Calexico," also offered to provide a bill of sale for
the vehicle in Alarcon-Serrano's name. Knowing Isaac's rep-
_________________________________________________________________
3 Although the INS attempts to use both of these provisions to support
the IJ and BIA decisions, four reasons dictate that we rely only upon sec-
tion 212(a)(2)(C) in reaching our conclusion in this case: (1) both the IJ
and BIA relied solely on section 212(a)(2)(C) in reaching their decisions;
(2) there is no evidence that Alarcon-Serrano has been convicted of any-
thing, see S 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (making excludable "any alien convicted
of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts
which constitute the essential elements of -- (II) a violation of (or a con-
spiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United
States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance"); (3)
Alarcon-Serrano consistently denied -- that is, did not admit -- having
knowledge of the marijuana's presence, see id. ; and (4) neither the IJ, nor
the BIA, nor the INS point to any particular law or regulation the essential
elements of which Serrano admits to having committed, see id.

                               8787


utation, Alarcon-Serrano testified that he suspected that the
car carried drugs. Nevertheless, Alarcon-Serrano claimed he
trusted that Isaac would not attempt to use him to smuggle
drugs, so he took the car notwithstanding his misgivings.

Although he began his journey to the border at 8 p.m.,
Alarcon-Serrano arrived at the border crossing itself at 9:15
that evening due to the length of the vehicle lines leading up
to the crossing. Alarcon-Serrano testified that he had not told
Isaac "the exact hour" that he would be crossing the border,
but that he observed Isaac crossing the border by foot at the
time he drove into the area. When Alarcon-Serrano saw that
the border officials intended to stop his vehicle, he claims he
honked his horn at Isaac, who looked at him and then looked
away. Border officials stopped the car and found the con-
cealed marijuana.

Alarcon-Serrano appeared pro se at his IJ hearing, having
waived the opportunity to seek a lawyer. At the hearing,
Alarcon-Serrano consistently denied knowledge of the con-
cealed marijuana. The IJ expressed doubt about Alarcon-
Serrano's claimed lack of knowledge, focusing on the fact
that he had received the car and a bill of sale in his name from
a suspected drug-smuggler he had met only four days prior to
his attempted border crossing. The IJ also found that the
amount of the concealed marijuana was "simply too large of
a quantity and too valuable to have been entrusted to a person
unaware of its existence."

Referencing their alleged simultaneous arrival at the border
crossing, the IJ found contradictory Alarcon-Serrano's testi-
mony surrounding the extent of Isaac's knowledge of the
details of Alarcon-Serrano's shopping trip to Calexico. The IJ
also found suspicious Alarcon-Serrano's lack of basic facts
about the friend through whom he had met Isaac. Alarcon-
Serrano testified that he was not sure of his friend's last name,
although he thought it was "Martinez," and could not remem-
ber the name of the street where his friend lives, although the

                               8788


two live only ten blocks apart. While earlier discussing char-
acter letters offered on his behalf by friends, neighbors, and
relatives, Alarcon-Serrano told the IJ that "I don't really know
the last names of my friends."

Finally, the IJ noted that Alarcon-Serrano intended to go
shopping in the United States at Walmart and Foot Locker
late in the evening, but testified that he did not know when the
stores closed. Alarcon-Serrano testified that if Walmart and
Foot Locker were closed, he would simply go to another store
that was open.

The IJ found that "circumstances correlate to show that
[Alarcon-Serrano] colluded with a known drug trafficker to
import in to the United States more than 80 pounds of mari-
juana," and told Alarcon-Serrano that "the evidence is clear,
convincing and unequivocal that you were a knowing traf-
ficker in the smuggling of marijuana." The BIA agreed with
the IJ that Alarcon-Serrano lacked credibility:

      his credibility is undermined by the fact that such a
      large amount of marijuana -- 86 pounds -- was
      found concealed in the car he was driving, by his
      admission that he knew the person who gave him the
      car was a drug dealer, and by his implausible expla-
      nations for how he came into possession of the car
      and why he attempted to enter the United States.

The BIA dismissed Alarcon-Serrano's appeal from the IJ's
order excluding and deporting him from the United States,
effectively affirming the IJ's decision.

Discussion

We determine our own jurisdiction de novo. See Milne v.
Hillblom, 165 F.3d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 1999). The BIA's fac-
tual findings are reviewed for "substantial evidence" and will
not be overturned unless the evidence compels a contrary con-

                               8789


clusion. See Yazitchian v. INS, 207 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir.
2000).

Before we may conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review
Alarcon-Serrano's case, we must determine that his case falls
within the terms of section 309(c)(4)(G). We have jurisdiction
to consider this jurisdictional question. See Ye v. INS, 2000
WL 732911, at *2 (9th Cir. June 9, 2000); Aragon-Ayon v.
INS, 206 F.3d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 2000).

[1] Under IIRIRA section 309(c)(4)(G),"there shall be no
appeal permitted in the case of an alien who is inadmissible
or deportable by reason of having committed a criminal
offense covered in section 212(a)(2) . . . of the[INA] (as in
effect as of the date of the enactment of this Act) . . . ." The
IJ and BIA determined that Serrano was excludable pursuant
to INA section 212(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. S 1182(a)(2)(C)
(amended 1999) (West Supp. 2000). At the time of the IJ
hearing in this case, section 212(a)(2)(C) designated as inad-
missible "[a]ny alien who the consular or immigration officer
knows or has reason to believe is or has been an illicit traf-
ficker in any such controlled substance or is or has been a
knowing assister, abettor, conspirator, or colluder with others
in the illicit trafficking in any such controlled substance."
INA S 212(a)(2)(C). In reviewing the jurisdictional facts, we
may only consider whether, pursuant to IIRIRA section
309(c)(4)(G), Alarcon-Serrano is (i) an alien (ii) who is inad-
missible (iii) by reason of having committed a criminal
offense listed in INA section 212(a)(2). If so, we lack jurisdic-
tion to proceed any further in our review. See Magana-Pizano
v. INS, 200 F.3d 603, 607 (9th Cir. 1999).

Although he has permanent resident status, there is no dis-
pute that Alarcon-Serrano is an alien. The only viable ques-
tion is whether he is inadmissible by reason of a criminal
offense under INA section 212(a)(2)(C). Unlike other provi-
sions of INA section 212(a)(2), the provision applicable to
Alarcon-Serrano does not require a conviction to demonstrate

                               8790


inadmissibility and, for purposes of IIRIRA section
309(c)(4)(G), a lack of federal appellate review. Under sec-
tion 212(a)(2)(C), the only requirement is that an immigration
officer "knows or has reason to believe" that Alarcon-Serrano
is an illicit trafficker in controlled substances or that Alarcon-
Serrano has knowingly assisted, abetted, conspired with, or
colluded with others in such illicit trafficking.

[2] The appropriate way of measuring whether the IJ and
BIA had "reason to believe" that Alarcon-Serrano knew he
was participating in drug trafficking is to determine whether
substantial evidence supports such a conclusion. In this
regard, the conclusion of the immigration judge must be
affirmed if based on reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence. See Hamid v. INS, 538 F.2d 1389, 1390-91 (9th Cir.
1976). Although to some extent this conflates review of the
jurisdictional facts and review of the merits in this case, see
Ye, 2000 WL 732911, at *2, this is the correct path to follow.

[3] Both the BIA and the IJ in this case found that it was
reasonable to believe that Alarcon-Serrano knew he was par-
ticipating in drug trafficking by taking and attempting to drive
across the border a car -- carrying eighty-six pounds of mari-
juana in a concealed compartment -- given to him by a man
he knew to be a drug smuggler whom he had met only four
days earlier. Alarcon-Serrano was therefore determined to be
inadmissible pursuant to INA section 212(a)(2)(C). Alarcon-
Serrano's inadmissibility pursuant to INA section
212(a)(2)(C) is undoubtedly supported by substantial proba-
tive evidence. Both the BIA and the IJ disbelieved Alarcon-
Serrano's testimony claiming lack of knowledge. While a
generous fact-finder might have believed Alarcon-Serrano's
version of the facts, both the BIA and IJ were clearly within
reason on these facts and circumstances to conclude other-
wise.

[4] Because an immigration officer had ample reason to
believe that Alarcon-Serrano knowingly engaged in drug traf-

                               8791


ficking, we lack jurisdiction to consider Alarcon-Serrano's
petition for review pursuant to IIRIRA section 309(c)(4)(G).
Hence, the petition is DISMISSED.

                               8792

							  
							  


Immigration Daily: the news source for
legal professionals. Free! Join 35000+ readers
Enter your email address here: