ILW.COM - the immigration portal Immigration Daily

Immigration Daily: the news source for legal professionals. Free! Join 35000+ readers

Home Page

Advanced search


Immigration Daily

Archives

Processing times

Immigration forms

Discussion board

Resources

Blogs

Twitter feed

Immigrant Nation

Attorney2Attorney

CLE Workshops

Immigration books

Advertise on ILW

VIP Network

EB-5

Chinese Immig. Daily

About ILW.COM

Connect to us

Make us Homepage

Questions/Comments


SUBSCRIBE

Immigration Daily

 

Chinese Immig. Daily



The leading
immigration law
publisher - over
50000 pages of free
information!

Copyright
©1995-
ILW.COM,
American
Immigration LLC.

Immigration Daily: the news source for
legal professionals. Free! Join 35000+ readers
Enter your email address here:



< Back to current issue of Immigration Daily < Back to current issue of Immigrant's Weekly

A CAT Among Wolves

by Jennifer Smythe

I. Introduction

The requirement of 'due process' is not a fair-weather or timid assurance. It must be respected in periods of calm and in times of trouble; it protects aliens as well as citizens.

-Justice Frankfurter (1951)[1]

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has witnessed and experienced the federal government’s abuse of constitutional due process protections.[2] While evidence of this abuse exists throughout civil and criminal law, immigration law has undoubtedly suffered the harshest attack.[3]  Although post 9/11 national security is of primary domestic concern, such security necessity must not replace our long-standing global commitment of protecting the persecuted and the weak. 

For centuries, aliens have sought refuge in the United States from the extraordinary violence and persecution of their homelands.  Over time, the United States government has afforded such aliens protective immigration status, including, refugee status and asylum.[4]  In 1994, President Bill Clinton further extended alien protection when he made the United States a full party to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).[5]  Under CAT, aliens who do not qualify for refugee or asylum protection, may, nonetheless, receive protective status if they can show that it is more likely than not that they will be tortured if returned to their home country.[6]  If the alien is successful, he/she is granted either withholding of removal or, in the case of aliens barred from withholding, deferral of removal.[7]  In either circumstance, the alien is protected by CAT and the federal government is prohibited from sending such alien back to a life of torture.[8]

Despite President Clinton’s humanitarian efforts by joining CAT, interim regulations developed in 1999 severely narrowed CAT protection.[9]  In particular, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) received regulatory authority to move, at any time, to terminate the cases of aliens afforded deferral of removal relief.[10]  These “motions to terminate,” if granted, require an immigration judge to make a de novo (new) determination, based on the record of proceeding and initial application, in addition to any new evidence submitted by the DHS, or the alien, as to whether the alien is still more likely than not to be tortured in the country to which removal has been deferred (the alien has already proved it once to succeed in the original grant of deferral).[11]  Judicial application of this broad de novo authority has led immigration judges to terminate deferral of removal status in violation of procedural due process and collateral estoppel.   

This article will set forth, by careful example of an actual case out of Virginia, that federal regulation 8 CFR §208.17(d), the termination provision which affords immigration courts broad authority to strip aliens of CAT’s deferral of removal protection, is unconstitutional as applied.  The analysis will demonstrate that judicial application of 8 CFR 208.17(d) results in immigration judges committing prejudicial error in two ways.  First, by failing to consider the entire record of proceedings as required by federal law, thus violating constitutionally protected procedural due process, and, second, by arriving at factual determinations already litigated, thus contravening the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 

II. Background

A. Overview of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)

The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) is a multilateral United Nations treaty that was signed by the U.S. in 1984 and ratified by the Senate in 1990.  The U.S. did not become a full party to the CAT until 1994 under President Bill Clinton.  Article 3 of the CAT prohibits all signatory countries from expelling, returning ("refouling") or extraditing a person to another country where there are substantial grounds for believing (“it is more likely than not”)[12] that he/she would be in danger of being subjected to torture.  This provision reinforces the universally-held standard that governmental acts of torture will not be tolerated by the international community.  Under CAT, torture is defined as any act by which severe mental or physical pain or suffering is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining information or a confession, punishing him/her for the acts of third parties, intimidating or coercing, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind by or at the instigation or acquiescence of a public official or a person acting in official capacity.[13]  During its ratification discussions, the Senate determined that:

mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from: (1)the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2)the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.[14]  (Emphasis added).

Note that torture does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in, or incidental to lawful sanctions.[15]

Claims under CAT are typically sought by aliens who have entered the U.S. to seek refuge but, who do not, for one reason or another, qualify for one of the other refugee protections, such as asylum or standard withholding of removal. To qualify for asylum or standard withholding, an alien must prove that he/she has been persecuted or has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.[16]  Conforming torture and persecution experience to such legal categories is often impossible for an alien, however, that does not conclude that perpetrations of torture and violence did not or will not exist for the alien in the country of removal. As a result, CAT provides a viable alternative to the complications of meeting the asylum or withholding requirements.[17]           

CAT creates two possible forms of relief: withholding of removal and deferral of removal.[18]  To succeed in a grant of withholding of removal, the alien must establish that it is more likely than not that he/she would be tortured if removed and that he/she is not barred from withholding as a result of criminal history or other factors. Those who meet this standard cannot be removed to the country where they would face torture. Deferral of removal protection is afforded to aliens who have proven the likelihood of torture but who are subject to one or more of the mandatory bars to withholding as a result of certain negative factors (i.e. criminal history).[19]  Aliens who meet the deferral standard may not be removed, regardless of these factors. That is, the U.S. may not return an alien, even if he/she has been convicted of an aggravated felony or other crime, to a country where he/she will likely face torture.[20]  While this may seem quite generous toward aliens whose conduct is undesirable, U.S. immigration courts, the United Nations, and the European Court of Human Rights are all in agreement that absolutely no one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.[21]  In fact, the European Court stated, regarding a treaty provision similar to CAT that prohibits removal of any individual facing torture, that:

Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society…The Court is well aware of the immense difficulties faced by States in modern times in protecting their communities from terrorist violence. However, even in these circumstances, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim’s conduct…[w]henever substantial grounds have been shown for believing that an individual would face a real risk of being subject to treatment contrary to Article 3 if removed to another State…the activities of the individual in question, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material consideration.[22]  (Emphasis added).

Deferral of removal relief exists to protect those individuals who would otherwise be barred from protection but, who, nonetheless, face torture in the country of removal. As a result of this unique protective category, aliens who succeed in a grant of CAT deferral of removal hold valid legal protection under which their criminal history or other negative factors are completely immaterial.

B. Federal Regulation, 8 CFR §208.17(d): Termination of Deferral of Removal Protection at the Request of the Department of Homeland Security and De Novo Review by Immigration Judges

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (now called “Department of Homeland Security” (DHS)) issued interim regulations in 1999 that established procedures for ensuring U.S.’ compliance with CAT with respect to the removal of aliens.[23]  Among the many provisions, the interim rule created the “deferral of removal” protection discussed above for aliens who would be tortured in the country of removal but who are barred from withholding of removal.[24]  Despite carving out this specific protective category, the interim rule also established the termination provision, 8 CFR 208.17(d), which gives the DHS broad regulatory authority to move at any time to terminate the cases of aliens afforded deferral of removal protection.  The relevant part states:

At any time while deferral of removal is in effect, the INS [now DHS] District Counsel…may file a motion with the Immigration Court…to schedule a hearing to consider whether deferral of removal should be terminated.The Service motion shall be granted if it is relevant to the possibility that the alien would be tortured in the country to which removal has been deferred and that was not presented at the previous hearing… The burden is on the alien to establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured in the country to which removal has been deferred.[25](Emphasis added).

Thus, federal regulation 8 CFR 208.17(d) assigns DHS expansive authority to move, at any time, to terminate deferral of removal protection and, if termination is ultimately granted, to deport aliens back to countries where they had, not long before, already proved they would face torture. Under this regulation, the standard for moving to terminate is quite low and can be invoked by DHS on multiple occasions.[26]  

In addition to the above, federal regulation 8 CFR §208.17(d) also governs the procedural elements of the termination proceedings. Specifically, it states that an immigration judges shall conduct a hearing and make a de novo (new) determination,[27] based on the record of proceeding and initial application in addition to any new evidence submitted by the DHS, or the alien, as to whether the alien is more likely than not to be tortured in the country to which removal has been deferred.[28] In these circumstances, the burden is on the alien, despite having already proven torture, to show that it is more likely than not that he/she would still be tortured in the country of removal. This is atypical of similar motions, such as motions to reopen, where the burden lies with the moving party, not the respondent.

C. Overview of Procedural Due Process in Immigration Law

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.[29]  The Fifth Amendment applies to federal government actions and the Fourteenth Amendment applies to state actions.[30]  Both provisions protect aliens as well as citizens in civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings.[31]

There are two types of legal due process: substantive due process and procedural due process. A substantive due process claim asserts that a law itself provides for an unconstitutional deprivation of a fundamental or individual right.[32]  A procedural due process claim does not challenge the law itself, but, instead, asserts that procedural safeguards established by a law were unfairly administered or, in some circumstances, violated or ignored.[33]  Note that procedural due process does not bar the government from procedural irregularities per se, only when life, liberty, or property is being taken is the government required to act with procedural correctness.[34]  This article will focus solely on procedural due process in the immigration context, although noting here that the line distinguishing substantive from procedural with respect to immigration is often blurred in the face of judicial application.

Procedural due process in the immigration context differs from procedural due process afforded to U.S. citizens in that immigration issues are typically at the mercy of Congressional deference and power. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress shall have the power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization. The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized this power as “plenary” (absolute) and out of this recognition has emerged the “plenary power doctrine.” [35]  This doctrine encompasses the unique judicial deference given to Congress in the realm of immigration. [36]  The Supreme Court has used the plenary power doctrine to defeat the constitutional claims of aliens seeking to challenge U.S. immigration laws.[37]  For example, the Supreme Court once stated that Congressional determination as to the necessity and validity of a law prohibiting the reentry of Chinese laborers was “conclusive upon the judiciary.” [38]  Perhaps the most notable example of judicial deference, however, was the U.S. Supreme Court’s statement in 1950, “Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.” [39]

While Congress has enjoyed expansive power and deference, the degree of this deference has varied depending on the immigration context. For example, the Supreme Court did not defer to Congress when it recognized procedural due process rights for aliens in deportation proceedings and for permanent resident aliens in exclusion proceedings.[40]  In addition, it has long been the case that aliens who have made it physically into the United States (as opposed to merely at the border or port of entry), either lawfully or illegally, are entitled to certain procedural due process protections, including a fair hearing, before being expelled from the country.[41]  While more conservative forums may criticize the U.S.’ protection of aliens in this manner, it is important to remember that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, provisions protecting all who are physically present in the United States, provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.  Thankfully, the U.S. Supreme Court determined in the 19th century that aliens are persons too.[42]

D. Collateral Estoppel in Immigration Proceedings

Similar to procedural due process, the principle of collateral estoppel [43] is arguably founded upon the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. [44]   Collateral estoppel provides that when a court has resolved disputed issues of fact properly before it, which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, another court is not to disturb that factual finding.[45]  The doctrine is based on the notion that a losing litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered, in adversarial proceedings, on an issue identical in substance to the one he subsequently seeks to raise.[46]  To hold otherwise would, as a general matter, impose unjustifiably upon those who have already shouldered their burdens, and drain the resources of an adjudicatory system with disputes resisting resolution.[47]   Collateral estoppel holds true when a court has resolved an issue, and should do so equally when the issue has been decided by a state or federal administrative agency which acts in a judicial capacity. [48]  (Emphasis added).    

III. Argument

A. Federal regulation 8 CFR §208.17(d), the provision that affords immigration judges de novo authority to terminate CAT deferral of removal protection, is unconstitutional as applied because it leads to prejudicial error in violation of procedural due process

Immigration judges apply their broad de novo authority under 8 CFR §208.17(d) unconstitutionally by ignoring entire records of proceedings in violation of procedural due process.  The case of Conrad,[49] which is still pending before Virginian immigration courts, is a prime example of such unconstitutional judicial application.

In Conrad, a Guyanese citizen (Mr. Conrad) living in the United States was deported because of his criminal history of possession of stolen property and reckless endangerment.[50]  Upon his arrival in Guyana, he was interrogated by Guyanese immigration officials about drug crimes he had not committed and repeatedly beaten every time he denied having committed such a crime.[51]  Following several beatings, Mr. Conrad was tortured and brutally sodomized (raped) by multiple Guyanese police officers to the point of unconsciousness while handcuffed to jail bars.[52]  The police informed him during the rape that deportees from the United States were not wanted in Guyana.[53]  Fearing for his life, Mr. Conrad fled back to the United States for safe harbor.[54]  After proving he would face the likelihood of torture in his home country, he was granted CAT deferral of removal protection.[55]  Subsequent to receiving protection, the federal government filed a motion to terminate Mr. Conrad’s deferral of removal status under federal regulation 8 CFR §208.17(d).[56]  A hearing was scheduled and, subsequently, the immigration judge terminated Mr. Conrad’s protection.[57]  In doing so, the Court stated that it was not reviewing the prior decision granting Mr. Conrad deferral of removal and the Court was not able to thoroughly acquaint itself with the basis of that decision.[58] 

The immigration judge violated procedural due process by failing to review the prior decision as procedurally required by federal law.[59]  Title 8 Section 208.17(d)(3) of the Code of Federal Regulations states that the immigration judge shall conduct a hearing and make a de novo determination, based on the record of proceeding and initial application in addition to any new evidence.  (Emphasis added).  Thus, the plain text of the regulation clearly requires the immigration judge to base his decision on the entire record of proceeding, which includes all proceedings that follow the initial application.[60]  In Conrad, the immigration judge expressly admitted that he did not review any of the evidence presented at Mr. Conrad’s initial deferral hearing.  Specifically, the Court stated that it did not have or review a transcript of the original hearing and that it was “quite difficult to hear the tape recordings which do exist of the prior proceedings.” [61]  Accordingly, the Court admitted that it was not able to thoroughly acquaint itself with the basis of the original decision.[62]  In addition, the Court in Conrad neither accepted the government’s offer to recite the specifics of the original hearing nor did the Court review the audio tapes from that hearing which the government admitted were audible. [63]  As is clear from this case, federal regulation 8 CFR § 208.17(d) is being applied unconstitutionally.  That is, immigration courts, like the Court in Conrad, are failing to review substantial or entire portions of the record of proceeding as required by federal law, despite their clear ability to do so.

The failure by judges to review full records of proceedings prejudicially and unfairly affects the outcomes of deferral of removal cases.  As in Conrad, immigration judges in initial deferral proceedings often determine that appellants will more likely than not be tortured in their country of removal.  If one immigration judge finds that an appellant is more likely than not to be tortured upon his return to his home country, surely the failure of subsequent courts to review or even “acquaint” themselves with the basis of original decisions contravenes procedural due process because it fails to take into account prior records as required by federal law and original judicial determinations favorable to the appellant.  Such a failure clearly ignores the procedural safeguards established by 8 CFR §208.17(d), specifically, that the immigration judge shall consider the full record of prior proceedings, thus evidencing that such regulation is unconstitutional as applied.

B. Federal regulation 8 CFR §208.17(d), the provision that affords immigration judges broad de novo authority to terminate CAT deferral of removal protection, is unconstitutional as applied because it leads to prejudicial error in contravention of the principles of collateral estoppel

Immigration Judges erroneously apply their broad de novo authority under federal regulation 8 CFR §208.17(d) in violation of collateral estoppel by retrying facts that have been properly and fairly litigated.  As stated above, collateral estoppel provides that when a court has resolved disputed issues of fact properly before it, which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, another subsequent court is not to disturb that factual finding.   

The case of Conrad (discussed directly above) is the perfect example of such unconstitutional application of the termination of deferral provision. [64]  In Conrad, the immigration judge allowed the retrial of facts already determined in the original proceeding.[65]  While the government presented new country condition evidence related to Mr. Conrad’s home country, the Court relied on detailed testimony by Mr. Conrad regarding the exact factual information (no new additional information) attesting to the likelihood of torture that was presented by Mr. Conrad at the original proceeding.[66]  This reliance led the Court to draw a separate conclusion based on previously litigated issues and ultimately, to terminate Mr. Conrad’s deferral of removal protection.[67]  Such termination would not have occurred if collateral estoppel principles had been observed in the subsequent proceedings.  Under such observance, the Court would have been prohibited from disturbing factual findings already made that led to Mr. Conrad’s original deferral protection.  As is clear, the judicial application of federal regulation 8 CFR §208.17(d) is erroneously permitting the retrial of deferral cases, thus ignoring the long-standing procedural doctrine of collateral estoppel.             

IV. Conclusion

Procedural due process requires that when government takes away a person’s life, liberty, property or other protected interest, the procedures used must be fair.[68]  Judicial application of federal regulation 8 CFR §208.17(d) violates such fundamental fairness by permitting immigration judges to ignore entire records of prior proceedings and retry factual issues already properly and fairly litigated.  In the context of deferral of removal, fundamental fairness is essential as any erroneous determinations (or terminations) expel otherwise protected aliens back to a life of torture.  Such erroneous application by immigration judges of their broad de novo authority contravenes the entire purpose and spirit of the CAT.  President Bill Clinton made the United States a party to the CAT in order to finally put the United States in line with prevailing international practices regarding the treatment of aliens facing torture at home.  To allow immigration judges essentially free reign to apply their broad de novo authority against the principles of the U.S. constitution and deport otherwise validly protected aliens back to dire violent and tortuous circumstances is a shameful regression in U.S. history that insults the humanitarian efforts behind joining the Convention Against Torture.


Footnotes

[1] Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-163 (1951).

[2] See Testimony of Nadine Strossen, President of the American Civil Liberties Union, in front of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, America after 9/11: Freedom Preserved or Freedom Lost?, November 18, 2003.  See also, Robert A. Levy, Jose Padilla: No Charges and No Trial, Just Jail, August 21, 2003, found at http://www.cato.org/dailys/08-21-03.html, and The Constitution Project, Report on Post-9/11 Detentions, found at http://www.constitutionproject.org/ls/detention_report.pdf.

[3] See American Immigration Lawyer’s Association, The Civil Liberties Restoration Act: A Response to Counterproductive Post-9/11 Policies, found at http://www.aila.org/fileViewer.aspx?docID=9847.

[4] INA §101 and INA §208.

[5] Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), July 16, 1994, found at http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html

[6] CAT, Article 3

[7] 64 FR 8478-01

[8] CAT, Article 3

[9] 64 FR 8478-01

[10] 8 CFR §208.17(d) 

[11] 8 CFR §208.17(d)

[12]  The U.S. Senate in ratifying CAT concluded that proving the existence of “substantial grounds” requires a showing that it is “more likely than not” that the individual would be tortured.

[13] CAT, Article 1

[14] 136 Cong. Rec. at S17491

[15] CAT, Article 1

[16] INA §208 and INA §101 (definition of “refugee”)

[17] 74 No. 45 INTERR 1773.

[18] 8 CFR §208.16 (withholding) and 8 CFR §208.17 (deferral).

[19] 8 CFR §208.17(a).

[20] 74 No. 45 INTERR 1773.

[21] 74 No. 45 INTERR 1773.

[22] 74 No. 45 INTERR 1773.

[23] 64 FR 8478-01

[24] 8 CFR §208.17

[25] 8 CFR §208.17(d).

[26] UNHCR’s Comments on Interim Rule Concerning the CAT.

[27] De novo hearings are hearings whereby the judgment of the trial court is suspended and the review court determines the case as though it originated in the review court.  See Steven H. Gifis, Barron’s Law Dictionary.

[28] 8 CFR §208.17(d)(3).

[29] US Constitution, Amendment 5 and 14.

[30] US Constitution, Amendment 5 and 14.

[31] 964 PLI/Corp 71.

[32] 92-04 IMMIGRBRIEF 1.

[33] 92-04 IMMIGRBRIEF 1.

[34] Emanuel Law Outlines, Constitutional Law, pg. 203 (2001).

[35] 83 Cornell L. Rev. 820.

[36] 83 Cornell L. Rev. 820.

[37] 83 Cornell L. Rev. 820.

[38] Chae Chan Ping v. US, 130 US 581 (1889).

[39] Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 US 537 1950.

[40] Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 US 86 (1903) and Landon v. Plasencia, 459 US 21 (1982).

[41] 83 Cornell L. Rev. 820.

[42] Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356 (1886).

[43] The doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata bind similar principles, but are distinguished by the fact that collateral estoppel involves “issues” and res judicata involves “claims.”  Here, collateral estoppel applies as this article is discussing the relitigation of factual issues. 

[44] Larita-Martinez v. INS, 220 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000).

[45] US v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 US 394, 422 (1966).

[46] Federal Savings & Loan v. Solimino, 501 US 104, 107 (1991).

[47] Federal Savings & Loan v. Solimino, 501 US 104, 107 (1991). See also, Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 US 322, 326 (1979).

[48] University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 US 788, 798 (1986).

[49] This case is being handled by Holland and Knight LLP in Washington D.C.  The case name has been changed to respect confidentiality.     

[50] Appellant’s Brief in Support of Appeal – Conrad.

[51] Appellant’s Brief in Support of Appeal – Conrad.

[52] Appellant’s Brief in Support of Appeal – Conrad.

[53] Appellant’s Brief in Support of Appeal – Conrad.

[54] Appellant’s Brief in Support of Appeal – Conrad.

[55] Appellant’s Brief in Support of Appeal – Conrad.

[56] Appellant’s Brief in Support of Appeal – Conrad.

[57] Appellant’s Brief in Support of Appeal – Conrad.

[58] Appellant’s Brief in Support of Appeal – Conrad.

[59] Note that the constitutional arguments stated in this article were not actually presented by Mr. Conrad on appeal as a result of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ lack of jurisdiction over constitutional claims.  Note, however, that Mr. Conrad won his appeal from a regulatory standpoint based on the same facts described here – that the immigration judge did not follow regulation 8 CFR 208.17(d) by failing to consider the entire record of proceeding.

[60] Appellant’s Brief in Support of Appeal – Conrad.

[61] Appellant’s Brief in Support of Appeal – Conrad.

[62] Appellant’s Brief in Support of Appeal – Conrad.

[63] Appellant’s Brief in Support of Appeal – Conrad.

[64] Appellant’s Brief in Support of Appeal – Conrad.

[65] Appellant’s Brief in Support of Appeal – Conrad.

[66] Appellant’s Brief in Support of Appeal – Conrad.

[67] Appellant’s Brief in Support of Appeal – Conrad.

[68] 92-04 IMMIGRBRIEF 1.

Jennifer Smythe©


About The Author

Jennifer Smythe is a J.D. Candidate, 2006, Golden Gate University School of Law; Honors B.A. 2000, University of California at Santa Cruz. She currently works as an immigration paralegal for the Law Office of Gali Schaham Gordon, an Immigration and Nationality law firm in San Francisco, CA.


The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the opinion of ILW.COM.


Immigration Daily: the news source for
legal professionals. Free! Join 35000+ readers
Enter your email address here: